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Climate change is already affecting societies worldwide, with the human fingerprint
increasingly apparent in climate events that are emerging against the background
of natural variability. Urgent and stringent mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions
is instrumental for reducing risks of intensifying climate hazards, but preserving
human livelihoods, economies and non-human ecosystems will also require a level of
adaptation to slow-onset hazards such as sea-level rise and extreme events such as
droughts, floods and heatwaves. Adaptation can substantially reduce the negative
impacts of climate change, but will require large financial, institutional, human and
socio-economic other resources. Quantitative estimates of future climate impacts so
far mainly rely on stylized representations of adaptation, where either no adaptation
takes place, or it is carried out optimally. Such representations disregard global
inequalities in socio-economic conditions, which will be decisive for the systems’
actual ability to deploy many of the adaptation measures. To better ascertain the
degree of adaptation that can be expected based on economic, financial, technological
and other capacities, projections of climate impacts and the ensuing loss and damage
should account for the co-evolution between climate hazards and socio-economic
development. To this end, this thesis connects several areas of climate change science
to offer a toolkit for improving the representation of adaptation in quantitative
modeling tools. The approach shown here embeds the socio-economic barriers to
adaptation identified in the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
for Climate Change (IPCC) into the scenario framework of Shared Socioeconomic
Pathways (SSPs) to – for the first time – establish quantitative pathways of adaptive
capacity. Integrating adaptive capacity in the scenario space opens opportunities
for a more nuanced operationalization of adaptation in quantitative modeling. In
the first half of the thesis, two extensions of the scenario framework are presented,
focusing on indicators of governance and gender equality as two of the key barriers
to adaptation that have not yet been part of the set of indicators in the SSPs.
Future trajectories of governance and gender equality explored in the first two
chapters show that decades might be needed to improve adaptive capacity even
in the best-case scenarios of socio-economic development, particularly in less
developed countries. The scenario-dependent timelines of overcoming different
socio-economic barriers suggest that high levels of adaptation might be unattainable
without addressing multiple development objectives in conjunction. The second
half of the thesis showcases two sectoral applications of adaptive capacity for
the health and agriculture sectors, demonstrating the relationship between socio-
economic conditions and differential vulnerability to possible climate stressors. The
two applications serve as an entry point for accounting for adaptive capacity in
estimates of future climate impacts such as heat stress and crop yield changes and
provide insights for policy-making in the field of adaptation planning. Together,
chapters of the thesis underscore the importance of considering adaptive capacity
in expectations of future adaptation and the resulting climate impacts. The toolkit
presented here is primarily suited for use in quantitative assessments of impacts
and alternative policy options to incorporate adaptation-relevant information, with




Die Folgen des Klimawandels sind für Gesellschaften auf der ganzen Welt deutlich
spürbar. Eine entschlossene Minderung der Treibhausgasemissionen in den nächsten
Dekaden ist entscheidend für die Verringerung des Risikos sich verschärfender
Klimagefahren. Gleichzeitig zeigen die Folgen des Klimawandels bereits heute, dass
der Erhalt der menschlichen Lebensgrundlagen, und Ökosysteme darüber hinaus
auch dringende Klimaanpassungsmaßnahmen erfordert. Anpassung bedarf es dabei
sowohl für langsam einsetzenden Gefahren wie dem Anstieg des Meeresspiegels
als auch für extreme Ereignisse wie Dürren, Überschwemmungen und Hitzewellen.
Erfolgreiche Klimaanpassung kann die negativen Auswirkungen des Klimawandels
erheblich reduzieren, erfordert aber gleichzeitig große finanzielle, institutionelle,
soziale und andere Ressourcen. Quantitative Abschätzungen zukünftiger Klimafol-
gen beruhen bisher vor allem auf stilisierten Darstellungen von Anpassung, bei
denen entweder keine Anpassung stattfindet oder sie optimal umgesetzt wird. Solche
Darstellungen lassen globale Ungleichheiten in den sozioökonomischen Bedingungen
außer Acht, die für die tatsächliche Befähigung diese Anpassungsmaßnahmen
umzusetzen entscheidend sind. Um das zu erwartende Ausmaß der Anpassung
auf der Basis wirtschaftlicher, finanzieller, technologischer und anderer Kapazitäten
besser bestimmen zu können, sollten Projektionen der Klimafolgen und der daraus
resultierenden Verluste und Schäden die Ko-Evolution zwischen Klimagefahren
und sozioökonomischer Entwicklung berücksichtigen. Diese vorliegende Promotion
leistet diesen interdisziplinären Brückenschlag und verbindet mehrere Bereiche der
Klimawissenschaft zur Entwicklung eines Toolkits zur Verbesserung der Darstellung
von Anpassung in quantitativen Klimafolgenmodellen. Der hier gezeigte Ansatz
bettet die im Fünften Sachstandsbericht des Weltklimarats (IPCC) identifizierten
sozioökonomischen Barrieren der Anpassung in den Szenariorahmen der Shared
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) ein, um - zum ersten Mal - quantitative Pfade
der Anpassungsfähigkeit zu erstellen. Die Integration der Anpassungskapazität in
den Szenarienraum eröffnet Möglichkeiten für eine nuanciertere Operationalisierung
von Anpassung in der quantitativen Modellierung. In der ersten Hälfte der Arbeit
werden zwei Erweiterungen des Szenariorahmens vorgestellt, die sich auf Indikatoren
für Governance und Geschlechtergleichheit konzentrieren - zwei der wichtigsten
Barrieren für Anpassung, die bisher nicht Teil des Indikatorensatzes in den SSPs
waren. Die in den ersten beiden Kapiteln untersuchten zukünftigen Trajektorien
von Governance und Geschlechtergleichheit zeigen, dass selbst in den Best-Case-
Szenarien der sozioökonomischen Entwicklung Jahrzehnte benötigt werden könnten,
um die Anpassungsfähigkeit insbesondere in weniger entwickelten Ländern zu
verbessern. Die szenarienabhängigen Zeitskalen für die Überwindung verschiedener
sozioökonomischer Barrieren legen nahe, dass ein hohes Anpassungsniveau an
Klimawandelfolgen ohne die gleichzeitige Verfolgung mehrerer Entwicklungsziele
unerreichbar sein könnte. In der zweiten Hälfte der Arbeit werden zwei sektorale
Anwendungen der Anpassungskapazität-Toolbox für die Sektoren Gesundheit und
Landwirtschaft vorgestellt, die den Zusammenhang zwischen sozioökonomischen
Bedingungen und der unterschiedlichen Verwundbarkeit gegenüber möglichen Kli-
mastressoren aufzeigen. Die beiden Anwendungen dienen als Ausgangspunkt für
die Berücksichtigung der Anpassungsfähigkeit bei der Abschätzung zukünftiger
Klimaauswirkungen wie Hitzestress und Änderungen der Ernteerträge und liefern
Erkenntnisse für die politische Entscheidungsfindung im Bereich der Anpassungspla-
nung. Zusammengenommen unterstreichen die Kapitel der Arbeit die Wichtigkeit
der Berücksichtigung der Anpassungsfähigkeit bei der Erwartung zukünftiger Anpas-
sungen und den daraus resultierenden Klimafolgen. Das hier vorgestellte Toolkit ist
in erster Linie für den Einsatz in quantitativen Abschätzungen von Auswirkungen
und alternativen Politikoptionen geeignet, um anpassungsrelevante Informationen
mit dem Ziel einer robusteren Darstellung des Klimawandels unter verschiedenen
Szenarien der sozioökonomischen Entwicklung einzubeziehen.
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Adaptation: . . . . . The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate
and its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit
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Adaptation barriers: Factors that make it harder to plan and implement
adaptation actions or that restrict options.
Adaptive capacity: . The ability of systems, institutions, humans and other or-
ganisms to adjust to potential damage, to take advantage
of opportunities, or to respond to consequences.
Adaptation limits: . The point at which an actor’s objectives (or system needs)
cannot be secured from intolerable risks through adaptive
actions.
Exposure: . . . . . . . The presence of people; livelihoods; species or ecosys-
tems; environmental functions, services, and resources;
infrastructure; or economic, social, or cultural assets in
places and settings that could be adversely affected by a
climatic event.
Hazard: . . . . . . . . The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced
physical event or trend that may cause loss of life, injury,
or other health impacts, as well as damage and loss to
property, infrastructure, livelihoods, service provision,
ecosystems and environmental resources.
Impacts: . . . . . . . The consequences of realized risks on natural and hu-
man systems, where risks result from the interactions of
climate-related hazards (including extreme weather and
climate events), exposure, and vulnerability. Impacts
generally refer to effects on lives; livelihoods; health and
well-being; ecosystems and species; economic, social and
cultural assets; services; and infrastructure.
Mitigation: . . . . . . A human intervention to reduce emissions or enhance the
sinks of greenhouse gases.
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Glossary
Pathways: . . . . . . The temporal evolution of natural and/or human systems
towards a future state. Pathway concepts range from sets
of quantitative and qualitative scenarios or narratives
of potential futures to solution-oriented decision-making
processes to achieve desirable societal goals. Pathway ap-
proaches typically focus on biophysical, techno-economic,
and/or socio-behavioural trajectories.
Risk: . . . . . . . . . . The potential for adverse consequences where something
of value is at stake and where the occurrence and degree of
an outcome is uncertain. In the context of the assessment
of climate impacts, the term risk is often used to refer to
the potential for adverse consequences of a climate-related
hazard, or of adaptation or mitigation responses to such
a hazard, on lives, livelihoods, health and well-being,
ecosystems and species, economic, social and cultural
assets, services (including ecosystem services), and infras-
tructure. Risk results from the interaction of vulnerability
(of the affected system), its exposure over time (to the
hazard), as well as the (climate-related) hazard and the
likelihood of its occurrence.
Scenario: . . . . . . . A plausible description of how the future may develop
based on a coherent and internally consistent set of
assumptions about key driving forces and relationships.
Note that scenarios are neither predictions nor forecasts,
but are used to provide a view of the implications of
developments and actions.
Vulnerability: . . . . The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected.
Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts and ele-
ments including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and
lack of capacity to cope and adapt.
Source: IPCC, 2018. Annex I: Glossary. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report
on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse
gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of
climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (Masson-Delmotte,
V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia,
C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy,




1.1 Adaptation in the climate change risk frame-
work
Events attributable to climate change are being detected at the present-day level of
global warming of about 1.1°C above the pre-industrial period (King, Black, et al.
2016; Herring et al. 2018; Otto et al. 2020). As a result of unabated greenhouse
gas emissions and current rates of warming, the global mean temperature is rising
by about 0.2°C per decade (IPCC 2018), which causes more pronounced sea-level
rise, heat, floods, droughts and other manifestations of climate change (Nauels
et al. 2019; Dottori et al. 2018; Schleussner, Deryng, et al. 2018; IPCC 2018).
Both the slow onset and the extreme events threaten livelihoods and economies
around the world, particularly in the tropical regions (Schleussner, Lissner, et al.
2016; King and Harrington 2018).
Risks of negative impacts of climate change on human and other ecosystems
fundamentally depend on three factors: hazard (physical manifestations of climate
change), exposure (population, ecosystems and assets exposed to hazards) and
vulnerability (propensity of the exposed system to be negatively affected by the
hazard) (Field et al. 2014; Mechler et al. 2019, see Glossary). The hazard component
is a function of the higher temperature and increases in frequency and/or intensity
1
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with every increment of warming (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2018). Reducing hazards -
as the physical manifestation of climate change - therefore predominantly depends
on the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. The exposure and vulnerability
components, on the other hand, depend on a broad range of socio-economic factors
that define the likelihood of a system being negatively affected by hazards. As
such, they are shaped by uneven development processes and are often intersections
of multiple socio-economic inequalities (Field et al. 2014).
Risks of climate change are unevenly distributed around the world, with many
developing and least developed countries bearing disproportionately high levels of
exposure and vulnerability. Projections of increasing likelihood and intensity of
climate hazards already in the near term, and the identification of areas that will
be most affected (Byers et al. 2018; Schleussner, Deryng, et al. 2018) stress the
need for adaptation, in addition to mitigation, as a necessary strategy to safeguard
livelihoods. Together with a continuously growing body of science, adaptation
has been elevated in the national and international climate policy arenas, and is
also enshrined in Article 7 of the Paris Agreement as a means to strengthen the
global response to climate change (UNFCCC 2015).
Adaptation is defined as “the adjustment in natural or human systems in
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates
harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (IPCC 2014, see Glossary). High levels of
adaptation could, for instance, in Africa and Central and South America, halve the
current estimate of risks of negative climate impacts on crop productivity, curtail
the spread of water-borne diseases; in Europe reduce risks of economic losses from
floods by more than a half; in North America reduce risks of heat-related mortality
by more than a half (Field et al. 2014). In extremely vulnerable places such as the
Small Islands Developing States, a high level of adaptation could reduce the risks
of impacts such as loss of livelihoods from inundation by about a third, which is
significant but lower than the potential of adaptation in other world regions (Field
et al. 2014). On the one hand, this means the risks of climate change can by no
means be avoided by adaptation alone and that fast and stringent mitigation is
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still a sine qua non. But, on the other hand, these examples and many more are
a clear signal that adaptation can substantially reduce risks in all world regions,
though with notable differences in its risk-reducing potential.
Estimates of the global costs of adaptation are currently in the range of 70
billion US dollars annually, expecting to reaching 140–300 billion US dollars in 2030
and 280–500 billion US dollars in 2050 (UNEP 2016). Global costs of adaptation
are estimated to be multiple times smaller than the costs of avoided impacts
(Global Commission on Adaptation 2019), while a failure to adapt will substantially
increase the costs (Gawith et al. 2020). In this context, it is important to note
that adaptation needs are unevenly distributed around the world, and so are the
vulnerabilities and the capacities to fulfill them. Costs of adaptation, relative to
GDP, are higher for low-income countries (Chapagain et al. 2020). In addition
to the uneven financing capacity, countries around the world differ in capacities
based on governance, human capacity and other socio-economic factors which can
be seen as the non-monetary requirements for adaptation.
In other words, whether and to what extent vulnerability and exposure can be
reduced by adaptation depends on adaptive capacity, defined as “the ability of a
system to adjust to climate change to moderate potential damages, to take advantage
of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences” (IPCC 2014, see Glossary).
Adaptive capacity is a function of financial, economic, institutional and other socio-
economic factors, which are not only unevenly distributed around the world but
also change over time. Adaptive capacity remains a core component of vulnerability
(with the two concepts sometimes used as synonymous, as noted in Preston (2009))
within the risk framework and is crucial to understand the discrepancies between
the theoretical and the practical possibilities for adaptation (Füssel and Klein 2006).
Holistic estimates of climate change risks require integrated analyses of hazards,
exposure and vulnerability, which account for both mitigation and adaptation as
the key strategies to fight climate change itself and its impacts, with a particular
focus on the socio-economic capacities to undertake efforts to reduce risks.
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1.2 Adaptive capacity and adaptation barriers
Adaptation to climate change is complex, both conceptually and practically. Adap-
tation actions concern different actors and require different resources. They can
be planned and anticipatory, which would typically involve public actors and
investments (e.g., investments into the development of climate change-resistant
seeds); or autonomous and responsive, mainly undertaken by private actors (e.g.,
a farmer changing crop varieties in response to changing rainfall patterns). Local
contexts and climatic conditions define what needs to be adapted to and which
actors should implement those adaptation options (Dilling et al. 2019). The portfolio
of possible adaptation options has been growing (IPCC 2001; Field et al. 2014),
making the assessment of adaptation costs, benefits and effectiveness increasingly
challenging. Individual adaptation options that are complex and context-specific
can be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to capture on the global level. In turn,
this poses a challenge for modeling of climate change risks, which needs to factor in
the potential to reduce the negative impacts of climate change through adaptation.
However, whether any adaptation options will be implemented depends in the
first place on adaptive capacity. Indicators of socio-economic conditions used to
capture the various socio-economic factors that enable or prevent a community,
country or region from implementing adaptation options (Smit and Wandel 2006)
can be used to understand the extent to which adaptation can be expected to
take place. This approach is rooted in the capability theory of Amartya Sen and
Martha Nussbaum (Sen 1999; Dilling et al. 2019), which originated in relation to
the broader issues of improving socio-economic welfare, arguing that increasing
individuals’ social, political, financial and other capabilities are the precursor
of, for example, eradicating poverty. The capability theory in the context of
climate change adaptation can be applied to propose that, before an adaptation
action is undertaken, actors’ capabilities regarding the access to finance, education,
technology, etc., need to be strengthened. The capability approach thereby offers
a lens to study factors that could hinder or enable – from financial, economic,
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institutional, social and political perspectives – a household, community or a country
to adapt, and help identify areas that need to be strengthened and empowered as
parts of comprehensive assessments of adaptation needs.
While the definition of adaptive capacity is not necessarily contested, in terms
of its focus on a system’s ability to adjust, factors that constitute adaptive capacity
have been identified in a broad and fragmented field of research. More than 150
indicators of adaptive capacity have been found in a recent literature review of
studies across different geographical and sectoral scales (Siders 2019). The vast
number of indicators aligns with earlier notions that adaptation needs are context-
dependent and need a broad range of actors involved in its implementation, and
they too vary between locations.
Conceptualization of adaptive capacity in this thesis is based on the presence (or
absence) of socio-economic barriers to adaptation - defined as “factors that make it
harder to plan and implement adaptation actions or that restrict options” (IPCC
2014, see Glossary). Theoretically, overcoming barriers builds adaptive capacity. The
absence of barriers, therefore, would signal high adaptive capacity and vice versa.
The conceptualization is made complicated by the numerous factors that have
been identified as barriers to adaptation in academic and grey literature. Similar to
adaptive capacity indicators, barriers comprise a “seemingly endless” list (Biesbroek
et al. 2013, pp. 1119). However, there are no clear indicators nor a systematic
way to assess adaptation barriers, although attempts have been made to create
frameworks to identify them (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). Identified barriers are often
context-specific and the research field is highly fragmented, making comprehensive
assessments additionally difficult (Biesbroek et al. 2013).
The categorization of adaptation barriers in this thesis is based on the Fifth
Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change
(IPCC) – the world’s largest synthesis of scientific knowledge on climate change.
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the regional and the sectoral distributions of adaptation
barriers identified in the literature included in the Chapter 16 on “Adaptation
opportunities, barriers and limits” of the IPCC Working Group II (Klein et al.
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Table 1.1: Classification of adaptation barriers by sector. The amount of evidence
is represented by a dot (one dot for relatively little and two dots for relatively ample
evidence). The cell is blank for complete lack of evidence. Since socio-economic barriers
are the focus of this thesis, biological and physical barriers are excluded from the table.
Source: adapted from Table 16-3 of the Chapter 16 of the AR5 (IPCC, 2014).
barriers




Freshwater • • • • • • • • •
Terrerstrial • • •






• • • • • • •
Urban
areas
• • • • • • • • • • • •
Rural
areas
• • • • •
Human
health
• • • •
Human
security
• • • • • • • •
2014). The synthesis of literature as shown in the tables was the state-of-the-art
at the time of publishing the AR5. The descriptions of each category of barriers
below follow the categorization of the AR5 but are complemented with scientific
evidence that has become available since the report was published in 2014.
1.2.1 Economic barriers
While economic and financial barriers to adaptation are sometimes used interchange-
ably, the AR5 draws a distinction between them, regarding economic barriers in
the broader context of (macro)economic development and sectoral compositions
of economies which might affect their adaptive capacity. Based on the scientific
evidence, there is “very high confidence”1 that both long-term trends and short-term
1In the IPCC language, very high confidence is assigned to statements that are products of
high agreement and robust evidence.
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Table 1.2: Classification of adaptation barriers by region. The amount of evidence
is represented by a dot (one dot for relatively little and two dots for relatively ample
evidence). The cell is blank for complete lack of evidence. Since socio-economic barriers
are the focus of this thesis, biological and physical barriers are excluded from the table.
Source: adapted from Table 16-3 of the Chapter 16 of the AR5 (IPCC, 2014).
barriers




Africa • • • • • • • • • • •
Europe • • • • •
Asia • • • •
Australasia • • • • • • • •
North
America




• • • • • • • • •
Polar
Regions
• • • •
Small
Islands
• • • • • • • • • •
Open
oceans
• • • •
dynamics of economic development are linked to the adaptive capacity through
various channels.
Firstly, adaptive capacity can be affected through multiple climate stressors
while also experiencing local and/or global macroeconomic disruptions. Studying
the “double exposure” of an economic downturn and climate change has shown ways
to spread risk and vulnerability over space and time and that these interconnections
need to be taken into account when planning a response (Leichenko et al. 2010). The
current Covid-19 pandemic is the most recent example of a health and an economic
crisis that can exert massive disruptions to the function of economic systems. A
crisis of this kind disrupts economic activity, increases unemployment and pushes
even more people into poverty and creates unsustainable levels of debt. Governments
might reprioritize their core economic issues at the expense of efforts to curb climate
change unless the crises are tackled simultaneously. In the specific example, the
direction of the economic recovery is still unclear, and international cooperation will
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be key to support climate-vulnerable countries in spurring an economic recovery
that is also climate-resilient (Andrijevic, Schleussner, et al. 2020).
Secondly, economic adaptive capacity will be affected by the sectoral composition
of the economy and the extent to which it relies on climate-sensitive sectors such
as agriculture, forestry, fisheries and/or tourism. While these sectors are present
in countries across the spectrum of income levels, developing and least developed
countries remain more reliant on the primary sectors whose productivity will be
affected by both slow-onset and extreme manifestations of climate change (World
Bank 2021; Schlenker and Lobell 2010; Müller et al. 2011). Similarly, areas where
tourism is the largest contributor to economic growth will also be disproportionately
exposed to the potential impacts of climate change (Scott et al. 2019).
1.2.2 Financial barriers
Lack of financial resources and financial instruments such as loans or insurance
often emerges as a key determinant of adaptive capacity. Financial barriers are
present across all sectors affected by climate change. Although they tend to be
more pronounced in developing countries (e.g., Chepkoech et al. 2020; Harvey et al.
2014), case studies from Europe and North America also point to the lack of access
to financial capital in some instances despite their presumed high financial capacity
(e.g., Biesbroek et al. 2013; Williges et al. 2017). The range of costs of adaptation
options and consequently the financial capacity they require varies widely, from a
relatively high cost of, e.g., building a sea wall, to a relatively small cost of, e.g.,
installing an air conditioning device. In addition, the pertinence of the constraint
will also depend on the financial capacity of the actor who is expected to bear
these costs. It has been shown that on the individual level, income is positively
associated with better disaster preparedness and coping with extreme events (Toya
and Skidmore 2007). The relevance of financial barriers and mechanisms to overcome
them is expected to increase further with adaptation’s growing costs (UNEP 2020).
Lack of financial resources often needs to be considered in conjunction with
other barriers. On the one hand, lack of finance can reinforce other barriers such as
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access to information or improving institutional capacity which need to be improved
first (Eisenack et al. 2014). On the other hand, corruption-ridden institutional
setting could misuse financial capital and render the financial resources ineffective
for deploying adaptation or a development strategy (Mahmud and Prowse 2012).
1.2.3 Human resources barriers
Coping with climate impacts requires substantial human resources for increasing
awareness and information dissemination of adaptation options and use of climate
services. They are important for leadership and policy planning of adaptation
implementation, research and innovation, use of technology, diversification of
economic portfolios towards more climate-resilient sectors.
In a recent review, Feinstein and Mach (2020) identify three roles of education –
as one of the key dimensions of human capacity – for climate change adaptation:
(1) protecting and investing in education infrastructure to reduce exposure to
climate hazards and to empower educators to strengthen educational outcomes; (2)
improving general education in terms of literacy, school attendance and educational
attainment and (3) adaptation learning support to increase capacity to prepare
for and learn from climate impacts.
A large body of research suggests that a better-educated population is less
vulnerable to extreme events (e.g., Muttarak and Pothisiri 2013; Hoffmann and
Blecha 2020; Pichler and Striessnig 2013). Similarly, more educated households
were more likely to use adaptive techniques in agriculture and adopt new cultivation
strategies (Wouterse 2017; Di Falco et al. 2011). In the longer run, higher education
is associated with higher climate change resilience (Frankenberg et al. 2013) but
also indirectly contributes to adaptive capacity through economic development
and health (Lutz, Muttarak, et al. 2014).
1.2.4 Governance barriers
Governance and institutional capacities have been identified as an adaptation
constraint present in all regions and all, but two sectors covered in AR5, which
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places it in the ranks of financial and information barriers as the most cross-cutting.
It has also been identified elsewhere in the literature as the most frequently reported
adaptation barrier (Biesbroek et al. 2013; de Coninck et al. 2018).
Implementation of policies, mobilization of resources, coordinating efforts and
decision making are factors that may enable or constrain adaptation and hinge on the
quality and efficacy of institutions (Klein et al. 2014; Berkhout 2012). For example,
institutional quality is associated with adopting environmental policies (Dasgupta
and De Cian 2018), and better governance has also been shown conducive to receiving
adaptation aid from donors (Weiler et al. 2018). On the other side, inept governance
can hinder the ability to fulfill adaptation goals (Berrang-Ford, Biesbroek, et al.
2019). The level of corruption has been shown as particularly relevant for adaptation
(Lesnikowski, Ford, Berrang-Ford, Barrera, Heymann, et al. 2015; Berrang-Ford,
Ford, et al. 2014) because it weakens institutions, damages public trust, diverts
funds from budgets and investment and can lead to a misuse of funds intended for
adaptation or post-disaster operations (Mahmud and Prowse 2012).
Given that governance is identified as one of the most prominent barriers to
adaptation, it is an indispensable dimension of adaptive capacity. For this reason,
Chapter 2 expands the SSP scenario set with a quantitative indicator of governance,
building on the relevant literature and thereby filling an important knowledge gap.
1.2.5 Social and cultural factors
A large collection of literature in the AR5 emphasizes the role of social and cultural
factors in perceptions of risk, consideration of adaptation options among different
actors and distribution of vulnerability influenced by factors such as gender, age,
social status, ethnicity, religion and culture (Moser and Ekstrom 2010; O’Brien
and Wolf 2010; Adger, Quinn, et al. 2012). Numerous case studies have identified
context-dependent mechanisms through which socio-cultural factors can hinder
adaptive capacity, contributing to the complexity of this interaction (Adger, Dessai,
et al. 2009). In addition, the difficulty of quantifying these factors makes their
comparison and modeling a daunting task.
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For example, Nielsen and Reenberg (2010) studied the uptake of adaptation in the
form of livelihood diversification in an in-depth analysis of a village in Burkina Faso,
showing that different cultural values enabled one and prevented another group from
adapting. Another study of Swedish foresters showed that their adaptation actions
were dependent on their belief about climate change (Blennow and Persson 2009).
Gender inequality has been identified as an important constraint to adaptation.
Women’s adaptive capacity could also be limited by cultural norms and entrenched
social structures, which are reflected in work divisions, norms around mobility
and decision-making, and access to financial and information resources (Rao et al.
2018; Rao 2017; Alston 2013; Pearse 2017). This is the focus of Chapter 3 which
expands the SSPs with an indicator of gender inequality. Lifting the knowledge
from specific case studies to the level of global pathways closes an important
gap in the current literature.
1.2.6 Information, awareness and technology
Lack of information and technology are also identified as some of the most common
adaptation barriers. Knowledge gaps about potential climate impacts and adapta-
tion options are observed in developing and developed countries alike (Biesbroek
et al. 2013; Thaler et al. 2019; Piggott-McKellar et al. 2019; Antwi-Agyei et al.
2015), though they can differ in severity (Lehmann et al. 2015). Misperception of
risk of climate change or overconfidence in the ability to deal with it can result in the
insufficient or complete absence of adaptation planning and implementation (Monirul
Islam et al. 2014; Kuruppu and Liverman 2011). On the flip side, information
on potential risks of storms, droughts or heatwaves, prioritization and planning
to prepare for them can greatly reduce vulnerability (Lutz, Muttarak, et al. 2014;
Street et al. 2019). Access to and deployment of technology for adaptation is also
often identified as an important dimension of adaptive capacity (McNamara and
Buggy 2017; Lybbert and Sumner 2012). Furthermore, awareness and access to
information and knowledge transfer can be crucial in its potential implementation
(Biagini et al. 2014).
11
1.3. Problem definition
Information and technological barriers often need to be considered together with
other barriers. For example, finance might play a decisive role in developing,
accessing and deploying technologies (Bryan et al. 2009). Or, as found in a
recent study, implementation of adaptation (in this case irrigation) largely failed
due to weak governance, despite having access to both finance and technology
(Higginbottom et al. 2021).
1.3 Problem definition
Since the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC, adaptation is prominently featured
in Assessment Reports as a strategy to reduce the risk of climate change across
different world regions and sectors. Figure 1.1, from the Summary for Policymakers
for the AR5 (Field et al. 2014), showcases climate change risks and possibilities to
reduce them through adaptation. The Figure (here cropped for brevity) focuses
on the African continent for two examples of climate change risks: degradation of
water resources driven by increasing temperatures and sea-level rise and reduced
crop productivity, driven primarily by changes in temperature and precipitation.
Figure 1.1: Risks from climate change in Africa and potential to reduce risks with
adaptation. Source: Assessment Box SPM.2 Table 1 (IPCC, 2014).
The last column (highlighted) shows the level of risk that can be reduced by
adaptation on three timeframes: current, near-term and long-term. The long-
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term timescale is disaggregated for two global mean temperature levels, namely
2°C and 4°C above the pre-industrial period. Risk can be reduced with two
possible adaptation levels: the current and a high level, with the high level of
adaptation in some cases exhibiting the potential to halve the amount of risk
compared to the current adaptation. While this speaks to the need for adaptation
based on its potential to reduce impacts, this kind of representation does not
account for whether a given level of adaptation can actually be deployed given
the socio-economic factors on which it is conditioned and therefore whether it can
reasnably be expected to actually reduce the risks. In the context of adaptive
capacity, adaptation deployment requires financial, human, technological and other
resources, implying that a high level of adaptation would require a high level of
such resources. Therefore, the stylized representation of adaptation could under-
or overestimate the extent to which risks could be reduced by adaptation if the
socio-economic barriers are not considered.
Another example of a binary representation of adaptation in the context of
climate change risks can be found in the recent IPCC Special Report on the Ocean,
Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (SROCC) (IPCC 2019). In the risk assessment of
sea-level rise, adaptation has the potential to reduce impacts with a “no-to-medium
response” and the “maximum potential response”2. While the “no-to-medium
response” assumes little change from the present-day circumstances, the “maximum”
response assumes a substantial reduction of risks through a combination of responses
under the assumption of “minimal financial, social and political barriers” (IPCC
2019, p. 34). Similarly to the example from 1.1, such investments into protection
against sea-level rise can amount to billions of dollars (Hinkel, Lincke, et al. 2014;
de Coninck et al. 2018) and hence may face a range of barriers in reality, particularly
in countries with limited fiscal space for undertakings of this degree.
Not accounting for heterogeneity between the world’s regions, countries and
communities in adaptation-relevant resources and access creates incomplete as-
2the word response replaces adaptation because possibilities such as planned or forced relocation,
which are controversial adaptation options, are included
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sessments of future risks of climate change. By failing to capture the actual
potential for adaptation conditioned on socio-economic contexts, potential for
adaptation could be overstated.
Quantitative research at the nexus of climate science, social science and eco-
nomics, which feeds into the kinds of estimates shown in Figure 1.1 or the example
of the SROCC, is not yet advanced in accounting for factors that enable or constrain
adaptation in the first place, nor what the temporal evolution of those factors could
look like (de Coninck et al. 2018). The socio-economic contexts are subjects to
dynamic temporal changes which are important considerations of hazards, exposure
vulnerability in the future. In tools such as models estimating climate change impacts
or Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) that assess ways to tackle climate change,
adaptation tends to be either absent or treated in a rather stylized way (Patt et al.
2010; Holman et al. 2019). The consequence of not accounting for adaptive capacity
when assuming a certain level of adaptation could underestimate climate impacts on
human and other systems because the expectations of adaptation might be detached
from the socio-economic realities. Overly optimistic expectations of adaptation for
risk reduction could also lead to downplaying the urgency and the required level
of mitigation, if adaptation would appear as a supplement to mitigation.
With the objective of advancing the understanding of future impacts of climate
change as a function of adaptation, this thesis connects several fields in climate
change research to deliver quantitative pathways of adaptive capacity, primarily
aimed at modeling tools that deal with various aspects of climate risks but do
not yet systematically incorporate adaptive capacity measures. The remainder of
the introductory chapter (1) reviews the representation of adaptation in modeling
tools and (2) introduces the scenario set of Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs)
and ways to embed adaptive capacity can be within their framework to create a
toolkit for assessment of adaptive capacity.
14
Introduction
1.4 Representation of adaptation in modeling tools
Compared to mitigation, adaptation has so far been less elaborately represented
in tools that help scientists study future impacts and damages caused by climate
change. In general, ample differences between mitigation and adaptation contribute
to this discrepancy in representation. Mitigation is oriented towards a global
goal (i.e., keeping the global mean temperature increase in line with the targets
of 1.5°C or well below 2°C compared to the pre-industrial period). Metrics to
assess the progress towards that goal are rather straightforward (e.g., the amount
of reduced greenhouse gas emissions). For adaptation, on the other hand, both
the goal and the metric are much more difficult to define because adaptation
tends to be context-specific, involve a broad range of actors, and provide local
rather than global benefits. The Paris Agreement, however, has made a step in
the direction of defining a global adaptation goal, calling for “enhancing adaptive
capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change,
with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate
adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal” (UNFCCC 2015).
Tracking adaptation performance vis-a-vis a goal is more difficult compared to
mitigation. However, there has been some progress on defining a framework to assess
adaptation progress on the global level (UNEP 2016) and on designing concepts
that could be used to compare adaptation progress between governments (Berrang-
Ford, Biesbroek, et al. 2019). Still, it can be difficult to differentiate adaptation
from other socio-economic development processes, which makes the estimates of
cost-effectiveness more difficult (Füssel 2010). This stresses the importance of
embedding the potential for adaptation in the context of socio-economic development
and understanding the future trajectories of adaptive capacity contingent on the
level of socio-economic development.
Independent of comparison to mitigation, adaptation with its many options,
actors, scales, and interactions, makes model representation a challenging task.
Nevertheless, the absence or oversimplification of adaptation in models misleads
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estimates of overall impacts and damages of climate change, for which reason
representation of adaptation is one of the critical research needs in the modeling
world (Schewe et al. 2019).
The remainder of this subchapter reviews ways in which adaptation is currently
represented in some of the models widely used. The most relevant types of models in
this context are Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) and climate impact models.
Though here treated separately, these models are often linked to study the effect
of policy decisions on climate-related outcomes.
1.4.1 Adaptation in IAMs
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) assess policy options and impacts of climate
change by combining socio-economic parameters with physical aspects of climate
change (Weyant 1995). While many types of IAMs exist, in broad terms they can
be separated into simple (cost-benefit) and complex (process-based) types. Most
simple IAMs that incorporate adaptation do so implicitly, without modeling the
process through which adaptation occurs, and assume that whenever adaptation is
a cost-effective opportunity (e.g., a sea wall will be built if the climate damages
exceed the cost of building a sea wall), it happens automatically (Patt et al. 2010).
This does not only assume the unconditional availability of the adaptation option
but to arrive to cost-benefit estimates, must also monetize the lives and homes of
those affected by sea-level rise. Steps towards explicitly accounting for adaptation
among the simple cost-benefit IAMs were made in models PAGE (Hope et al.
1993), and the more recent AD-DICE (De Bruin, Dellink, and Tol 2009) and its
regional extension AD-RICE (De Bruin, Dellink, Agrawala, et al. 2009). However,
adaptation has been criticized for being overly optimistic in PAGE (De Bruin,
Dellink, and Tol 2009), while AD-DICE and AD-RICE still treat adaptation as
either non-existent or applied optimally whenever it is possible.
The feature of the simple IAMs to conduct cost-benefit types of analyses of
efforts to tackle climate change, the assessment of the relative effect of adaptation
and mitigation on climate damages makes them appear as substitutes. For example,
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AD-DICE model (De Bruin, Dellink, and Tol 2009) suggests that the mitigation
target can be reduced by one quarter when optimal adaptation is implemented.
This is a misleading representation of the reality in which the two measures act on
different spatial and temporal scales, have differential impacts on people’s welfare
depending on the level of exposure and vulnerability to climate impacts (Klein et al.
2014). DICE model has also been recently criticized for outdated parametrization
of mitigation-relevant factors that produce misleading estimates (Hänsel et al.
2020). Optimal calibration is based on estimates of adaptation at the point at
which the costs and the residual impacts are minimal. As a result, regarding them
as substitutes means that adaptation investments can reduce mitigation targets,
which justifies the earlier mentioned concern that adaptation could downplay the
urgency of mitigation. Defining the optimal level of adaptation could lead to
conclusions about the necessary level of mitigation, which could be underestimated
because the damages of climate change with optimal adaptation appear lower than
they would be if adaptation barriers would be incorporated into considerations
of whether adaptation can be deployed.
De Bruin and Dellink (2011) included various barriers to adaptation identified in
the literature in the AD-DICE08 model. While this was a valuable contribution, this
approach was global and for a single point in time, while adaptation barriers differ
across countries and sectors and might evolve in different trajectories. Additionally,
the barriers identified by de Bruin and Dellink (2011) are unrelated from the
synthesis of the IPCC reports and are disconnected from the scenario framework
of the SSPs, which provide a way to harmonize scenarios across models.
Complex IAMs, on the other hand, primarily estimate greenhouse gas emissions
from the interaction between population, economy, land use and energy systems.
They often have linked modules that use the emissions (and the corresponding
temperature increase) to estimate impacts on different sectors. Complex IAMs still
vary in complexity as they represent interactions between various actors and sectors
in different ways. While IAMs can provide detailed estimates on mitigation costs,
adaptation is by and large absent from the current state of the art. Incorporating
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impacts and adaptation into complex IAMs is one of the major research frontiers
in the field, though challenges such as lack of quantitative data that models could
use hampers these efforts (Clarke et al. 2014). Without accounting for adaptation
pathways, however, models will not reliably incorporate climate impacts or estimate
economic damages, for which reason approaches to quantify adaptation are some
of the highest priorities.
1.4.2 Adaptation in physical models
Impacts of climate change are modeled through models that focus on capturing the
biophysical relationships between climatic conditions and, for example, land use and
agricultural processes, water availability, coastal changes, etc. These relationships
are, of course, complex and influenced by many biological, physical and chemical
processes. But beyond those, adaptation that requires human interventions will
also depend on a set of socio-economic factors (Brown et al. 2017). Physical models
suffer from similar drawbacks in the treatment of adaptation as the economic
models discussed above. These assumptions are similarly consequential as was
the case for the IAMs: simplistic assumptions about the optimal or unconstrained
uptake of adaptation lead to overly optimistic estimates of adaptation, thereby
underestimating future climate impacts. Conversely, modeling exercises that do not
incorporate adaptation at all can overestimate impacts (Minoli et al. 2019).
An overview of adaptation in climate impact models finds that, among the
models that consider adaptation in some way, about a third does not incorporate
adaptation barriers, the temporal dynamics of the barriers or the limits to the
uptake of adaptation and only one-tenth of the models account for all three of
those factors (Holman et al. 2019). Failing to account for barriers reinforces the
assumption that adaptation will be readily available and implementable, similar to
the example from the SROCC shown earlier. The overview also finds that adaptation
in agricultural models is more frequently and more comprehensively represented
than in water models, though largely reflecting the underlying model assumption
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surrounding optimization and equilibrium underlying model assumptions, rather
than empirical evidence on factors that trigger adaptation.
Complex or process-based IAMs have been coupled with sectoral impact models,
which is an application space for the toolkit presented here, particularly for models
that already “understand” the SSP scenarios. For example, the coupling of the
DIVA coastal model (Hinkel and Klein 2009) and the IMAGE IAM (Stehfest et al.
2014) to assess flooding damages (Hinkel, Vuuren, et al. 2012). Adaptation is
scenario-specific to the extent that it depends on wealth, but based on a recent
overview of local barriers to coastal adaptation (Hinkel, Aerts, et al. 2018) identifies
additional economic, financial, technological and socio-cultural barriers that will
also need to be overcome for adaptation deployment. This overview could serve
as an update and used to couple the identified barriers with SSP trajectories of
adaptation barriers and be used in the DIVA model of coastal adaptation.
Accounting for adaptive capacity is highly relevant for the agriculture sector,
whose impact models have also been coupled with IAMs to assess crop yields under
different mitigation and socio-economic scenarios (Havlik et al. 2014; Popp et al.
2014; Stehfest et al. 2014). Adaptation in these coupled models mostly happens
without considering the barriers, which can be improved upon by understanding
factors that constitute low or high adaptive capacity in the agricultural sector
(i.e., socio-economic factors correlated with irrigation, fertilization and other crop
management practices) (Schewe et al. 2019).
Similarly, coupling IAMs and impact models allows for studying the impacts
of heat stress on human health and mortality, as well as ways in which heat
stress interacts with energy demand for cooling. Quantifying impacts of global
warming on human health is an active and policy-relevant research field and another
sectoral application area for adaptive capacity indicators (Schwingshackl et al.
2021; Colelli and Cian 2020).
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1.5 Methodological framework: connecting the
SSPs and adaptation barriers
The SSP scenario framework (O’Neill, Kriegler, et al. 2017) is used to bridge the
qualitative identifications of determinants of adaptive capacity with a quantification
meaningful for IAMs and climate impact models.
Scenarios are a commonly used tool to explore uncertainty. Many models rest
on assumptions that are highly uncertain, particularly those that relate to socio-
economic systems which are outcomes and parts of complex dynamics. Scenarios are
limited to a commonly agreed upon set in order to facilitate comparison between the
modeling groups and the users of climate services that result from this research. The
current state-of-the-art of the climate impacts science relies on a framework with
two components: scenarios of future greenhouse gas emissions which translate into
different global warming levels and scenarios of future socio-economic conditions.
The two components are meant to be used in an integrated way by models to
analyze the consequences of future warming levels meeting future societies.
SSPs - the socio-economic component of the scenario framework - consist of
five scenarios that rest on qualitative narratives or storylines that span a broad
range of plausible futures of the 21st century in terms of demographics, economic
conditions, inequality, international cooperation, technological change and other
socio-economic factors (O’Neill, Kriegler, et al. 2017). The five scenarios describe
challenges to adaptation and mitigation that stem from alternative societal trends
and they by design do not incorporate climate impacts but represent baseline
conditions in the absence of climate change (Figure 1.2).
SSP1, the “Sustainability” scenario, is a future of progressive socio-economic
development, with increasing investments in health and education which contribute
to slower economic growth, economic growth powered by increasingly decarbonized
energy systems, fast technological progress, reduced inequalities both within and
between countries and increased international cooperation and management of
the global commons. Objectives of economic growth shift towards well-being in
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Figure 1.2: SSP scenarios assessed according to their challenges to adaptation and
mitigation
developed countries, while developing countries are supported in pursuing green
economic growth. Converging global development based on green energy makes
this scenario exhibit low adaptation and mitigation challenges. Although none of
the scenarios are actually tailored to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), many of the elements of SSP1 resonate with the SDG targets. The
properties of the SSP2, also termed “The Middle of the Road”, is a scenario of
moderate challenges both for mitigation and adaptation. It is largely a continuation
of historical trends, with economic growth and development happening unevenly
across the world, population growth leveling off in the second half of the century
with insufficient investments in education precluding more substantial progress.
There is some technological progress, but without major advancements. Resource
intensity of economic growth somewhat reduces, but reliance on fossil fuels remains.
There is a tendency to refer to this scenario as the one closest to reality, but this
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does not necessarily hold and was not the intention of the scenario designers who
stress that the scenario set should be used jointly.
SSP3, the so-called “Rocky road” or scenario of “regional rivalry”, describes a
world where the focus shifts towards national and regional issues, trade is weakened
by barriers and countries orientate towards national and regional food and energy
security at the expense of development outside the region, and regional conflicts
emerge. Economic growth is slow and resource-intensive, investments in education
and health are reduced, while population growth is high in developing countries
and low in developed. Inequalities are on the rise the and technological progress is
weak. The combination of slow and unequal socio-economic progress, weak global
institutions and tepid cooperation on solving problems make challenges for SSP3
high both for mitigation and adaptation to climate change.
The world of inequality in SSP4 envisages an increasing rift in socio-economic
development worldwide, driven by unequal investments in education, which create
disparities in economic and political opportunities. Convergence in economic
growth does not happen because growth remains moderate in developed countries
and sluggish in developing and low-income countries. Similarly, technological
progress is substantial in rich countries while developing countries may struggle
with providing necessities such as sanitation. Since wealthy countries progress
towards decarbonizing their energy sectors, while a large part of the world remains
at low levels of development, this scenario is characterized by low challenges to
mitigation but high challenges to adaptation.
Finally, the SSP5 is the scenario of “Fossil fueled development” in which
industrialization rapidly takes off worldwide, with hefty investments in innovation
and education, markets become increasingly integrated and international cooperation
is strong. Population growth slows down in currently high fertility countries and
slightly increases due to an optimistic economic future in countries where currently
birth rates are low. The attitude towards environmental problem solving is techno-
optimistic, with faith in engineering solutions to climate change. For this reason,
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SSP5 is considered to have low challenges to adaptation but high challenges to
mitigation due to its fossil-fueled economic growth.
The adaptation side of the SSPs remains under-explored compared to mitigation,
although the scenarios allow for the assessing societies’ abilities to adapt and
adaptation pathways instead of mere assumptions that adaptation will occur (van
Ruijven, Levy, et al. 2013; O’Neill, Carter, et al. 2020). The collection of papers
in this thesis contributes to closing this gap with a representation of adaptive
capacity within the scenario framework.
Scenario elements that describe future socio-economic development can be
connected to the adaptation barriers identified in the AR5, which can be used
to quantify adaptive capacity. Elements of the SSPs were quantified as part of
the original scenario package and they provide country-level projections of GDP
per capita (Crespo Cuaresma 2017; Dellink et al. 2017; Leimbach et al. 2017),
population size and age structure (KC and Lutz 2017), educational attainment
(KC and Lutz 2017) and urbanization (Jiang and O’Neill 2017). The scenarios
have been expanded with projections of indicators of the Human Development
Index (Crespo Cuaresma and Lutz 2015), inequality (Rao et al. 2018), conflicts
(Hegre, Buhaug, et al. 2016), and two extensions that are parts of this thesis:
governance (Andrijevic, Crespo Cuaresma, et al. 2020a) and gender inequality
(Andrijevic, Crespo Cuaresma, et al. 2020b).
In the current form, the quantified SSP elements can be used as proxies for
adaptation barriers identified in the AR5 and shown in Table 1.1 (for sectors) and
Table 1.2 (for regions). For example, economic and finance dimensions can be
proxied with urbanization and GDP. Information and human capacity barriers
can be represented with education, population structure and HDI. Governance
barriers can be proxied with a governance indicator as proposed in Chapter 2.
Socio-cultural barriers can be represented by, for example, income inequality and
gender inequality proposed in Chapter 3. While the AR5 adaptation barriers and
the SSP dimensions do not necessarily correspond to one-on-one mapping (e.g.,
economic barriers such as the sectoral composition of economies are not yet part of
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the SSP framework), the SSP indicators are not an exhaustive set and they can
be updated and supplemented with new and additional indicators.
The adaptation barriers and SSP indicators can be combined to represent the
adaptive capacity for a particular adaptation option, a sector or a geographical
unit. Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate how statistical regressions can be used to identify
dimensions of the SSPs relevant for two adaptation options and thereby assess
adaptive capacity. The next section will elaborate on why this is necessary from
the perspective of modeling tools and how the current representation of adaptation
or absence thereof can underestimate future climate impacts.
Timescales of adaptive capacity, in terms of barriers to adaptation and how
they can be overcome, are critical for understanding adaptation. Identification of
barriers in different sectors relevant for climate change adaptation, and insights
into their plausible scenarios, provides a research and a policy tool to understand
target areas for additional efforts needed to overcome barriers and enhance adaptive
capacity to deal with climate change.
1.6 Objective and the scope of the thesis
Uncertainties surrounding adaptation’s socio-economic context are an important
consideration in projections of overall climate impacts and strategies to address
them. This thesis integrates adaptive capacity within the scenario framework of
future socio-economic pathways and thereby help explore this uncertainty space.
Assessment of adaptive capacity is conceptualized through quantified barriers to
adaptation identified in the literature. The “toolkit” to assess adaptive capacity
presented here is primarily aimed at models that already operate with SSP scenarios,
mostly complex IAMs and climate impact models. The application of this toolkit
is a step forward in the representation of adaptation and subsequently climate
change damages but can also be applied for any exploration of uncertainty for
strategies that hinge on socio-economic factors.
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The socio-economic conditions are, of course, not limited to understanding
climate change adaptation but are also central to the broader development objectives,
which inevitably have to be regarded in the context of climate change. Two-thirds
of the world population live in countries classified as “developing” (UNCTAD 2020)
and are confronting challenges such as poverty eradication and widespread provision
of public goods such as health care and education. Since many of these countries
will bear the brunt of climate change impacts, development needs to be considered
in conjunction with adaptation to reduce the risks of impacts.
Ability to adapt will be particularly decisive for countries that are at the risk of
experiencing loss and damage, which refers to the residual climate-induced losses
and damages resulting from an inadequate capacity to adapt or exceedance of
available possibilities to adapt to climate change hazards (Mechler et al. 2019).
Loss and damage can mean both economic and non-economic values (i.e., items
that are not traded in markets, such as human life, health, culture, heritage etc.)
(Serdeczny et al. 2017). Some climate hazards might exceed hard limits where no
adaptation is possible, thereby rendering loss and damage unavoidable. However,
for hazards that are still manageable with adaptation options, improvements in
adaptive capacity will be key to reduce loss and damage (Warner and Van Der Geest
2013). Therefore, improved asssessement of climate impacts through accounting
for future pathways of building adaptive capacity can be helpful for estimating
the extent of loss and damage for the most vulnerable.
The structure of the thesis is shown in Figure 1.3. Chapters 2 and 3 expand the
SSPs with two additional indicators of adaptation barriers, and Chapters 4 and 5
exemplify sectoral application of the quantitative assessment of adaptive capacity.
Chapter 6 synthesizes the results of Chapters 2-5, discusses their implications,
limitations and suggests avenues for future research.
Chapter 2 is a study on governance in the context of adaptive capacity. Gov-
ernance is the most prominently featured barrier to adaptation in the AR5 of the
IPCC but quantitative assessments were so far absent from the scenario framework.
The indicator of governance used here is broadly conceptualized as quality of
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Figure 1.3: Structure of the thesis.
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institutions, rule of law, control of corruption and political stability, as indispensable
ingredients of adaptation planning and implementation. The study combines the
multi-dimensional Worldwide Governance Indicator (Kaufmann 2010) with global
panel regressions to estimate other socio-economic components that correlate with
governance and uses the statistical relationship to extrapolate it in a manner that
is internally consistent with the SSP scenarios.
Chapter 3 is the second extension of the SSPs, focusing on gender inequality
as another key adaptation barrier and a component of adaptive capacity. A large
body of literature established that women are disproportionately vulnerable to
climate change. This relative position compared to men is not assumed to be a
product of inherent characteristics of women that make them more vulnerable,
but of social structures that deprive women of adaptive capacity in terms of
finance, information, education, or through obligations to commit to house work
and care for dependents, etc. The study uses the Gender Inequality Indicator
(UNDP 2018) which encompasses dimensions of gender inequality in economic and
political opportunities, health and education. The indicator can be meaningfully
proxied as a linear combination of income, education and gender inequality in
education. This relationship is subsequently used to project gender inequality
along the five SSP scenarios.
Chapter 4 is the first application of the concept of adaptive capacity within the
SSP framework. It uses the concept of the cooling gap, defined as the difference
between the population exposed to heat stress and population with the capacity to
adapt to it with the use of air conditioning. Country-level adaptive capacity in the
face of heat stress is found to be a function of GDP per capita, urbanization and
income inequality. The study estimates the cooling gap for the different SSPs and
contributes to identification of hotspots of vulnerability around the world.
Chapter 5 is the second application of adaptive capacity. An empirically derived
gap between current agricultural crop yield and the maximum potential yield
based on biophysical conditions is the starting point. The gap is expressed as
a Sustainable Irrigation Deployment Index (SIDI) designed for the study of this
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chapter. The SIDI assesses the potential to increase agricultural yields through the
use of sustainable irrigation, and socio-economic factors that correlate with the SIDI
are established using a simple statistical model. The governance indicator introduced
in Chapter 2 – defined as the institutional capacity of countries – emerges as a
socio-economic factor that best explains the current level of sustainable irrigation
deployment. Future trajectories of governance are then used as predictors for
the future closing of the yield gap.
1.7 Statement on contribution to the chapters of
the thesis
This doctoral thesis includes two manuscripts published in peer-reviewed journals,
and two manuscripts under review. I, Marina Andrijevic, declare herewith to be the
lead author of three out of four chapters in this thesis. Contributions, as detailed
here below, have been confirmed in writing by all co-authors.
Chapter 1 (Introduction) and Chapter 6 (Discussion and conclusion) were
written by Marina Andrijevic. Dr. Sabine Fuss provided feedback on the earlier
drafts of Chapters 1 and 6.
Chapter 2:
Andrijevic, Marina, Jesus Crespo Cuaresma, Raya Muttarak and Carl-
Friedrich Schleussner. “Governance in socio-economic pathways and its role
for future adaptive capacity”. Nature Sustainability 3, no.1 (2020): 35-41.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0405-0
M.A. and C.F.S. conceived the study. M.A. performed the analysis with the
guidance of J.C.C. M.A. wrote the manuscript with contributions of all authors.
Chapter 3:
Andrijevic, Marina, Jesus Crespo Cuaresma, Tabea Lissner, Adelle Thomas
and Carl-Friedrich Schleussner. “Overcoming gender inequality for climate
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//doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19856-w
M.A. conceived the study. M.A. performed the analysis with the guidance of
J.C.C. M.A. wrote the manuscript with contributions of all authors.
Chapter 4:
Andrijevic, Marina, Edward Byers, Alessio Mastrucci, Jeroen Smits, Sabine
Fuss. “Future cooling gap in Shared socio-economic Pathways”. In review in
Environmental Research Letters
M.A. conceived the study and performed the analysis with feedback from E.B.
and A.M. E.B. provided the climate input data. The data on air conditioning
was provided by J.S. with contributions from A.M. M.A. wrote the manuscript
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Abstract
Weak governance is one of the key obstacles for sustainable development. Undoubt-
edly, improvement of governance comes with a broad range of co-benefits including
countries’ abilities to respond to pressing global challenges such as climate change.
However, beyond the qualitative acknowledgment of its importance, quantifications
of future pathways of governance are still lacking. This study provides projections
of future governance in line with the Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs).
We find that under a “rocky road” scenario, 30% of the global population would
still live in countries characterized by weak governance in 2050, while under a
“green road” scenario weak governance would almost be entirely overcome over the
same time frame. Based on pathways for governance, we estimate the adaptive
capacity of countries to climate change. Limits to adaptive capacity exist even under
optimistic pathways beyond mid-century. Our findings underscore the importance




Future societies’ resilience against global challenges such as climate change hinges
upon successful implementation of policies, actions and development strategies
(IPCC 2018). Those actions need to be facilitated by the quality and efficiency of
governance, which makes governance an essential ingredient for assessing countries
future climate vulnerability and coping capacity (Klein et al. 2014). More broadly,
institutions and governance are key determinants of long-term stability and sus-
tainable growth of nations (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013). Advancing human and
economic development requires active and effective governance capable of making
relevant policy addressing present day challenges and providing quality welfare and
services (Hughes et al. 2014). This is also the focus of Sustainable Development
Goal (SDG) 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions), which aims at promoting
the rule of law; substantially reducing corruption, developing effective, accountable
and transparent institutions and building of institutional capacity at all levels (UN
General Assembly 2015). Likewise, strengthening institutions to achieve beneficial
social outcomes is central to the fulfilment of other SDGs, such as ending poverty in
all its forms everywhere (SDG 1), achieving gender equality (SDG 5) and reducing
inequality within and among countries (SDG 10) (UN General Assembly 2015).
With respect to countries’ capacity to adapt to climate change, good governance
and institutions have been identified as key conditions for the successful deployment
of adaptation options (Eisenack et al. 2014; Klein et al. 2014). The IPCC’s Fifth
Assessment Report (AR5) characterizes adaptation barriers (or constraints) as
“factors that make it harder to plan and implement adaptation actions or that
restrict options”. Lack of institutional capacity is identified as the most pertinent
constraint to adaptation across many sectors (e.g. water, urban areas, human
health, human security) and in all world regions (Klein et al. 2014). The numerous
interventions that may enable or hinder adaptation – such as prioritizing policies,
mobilizing resources, coordination of efforts, decision-making – are processes often
contingent on the efficacy of institutional mechanisms (Klein et al. 2014). A recent
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review of economic literature on adoption of environmental policy, for instance,
finds a positive relationship between policy adoption and various indicators of
institutional quality (Dasgupta and De Cian 2018). Inept governance can even
hinder a country’s ability to realize adaptation goals and targets set according to
the country’s level of vulnerability (Berrang-Ford, Biesbroek, et al. 2019). Countries
with better governance are also found to be more likely to receive adaptation
aid from donors since it is assumed that adaptation funding will be used more
effectively (Weiler et al. 2018).
In particular, the level of corruption within institutions, which is one of the main
determinants of the quality of governance, is highly relevant for climate change
adaptation (Lesnikowski, Ford, Berrang-Ford, Barrera, Heymann, et al. 2015;
Berrang-Ford, Ford, et al. 2014). In a country with weak governance, investments
in adaptation measures can potentially pose corruption risks (Mahmud and Prowse
2012). There is evidence that the level of corruption such as bribery and misuse
of resources can be more severe in post-disaster operations as compared to the
pre-disaster (Mahmud and Prowse 2012). Corruption weakens institutions, damages
public trust and the strength of social contract, diverts funds from budgets and
investments, interferes with the flow of development aid and hinders human capital
formation (Mauro 1995; Abed et al. 2002). Improving governance and strengthening
anti-corruption measures thus is critical for implementation of adaptation actions.
Understanding current and future evolution of governance is necessary for
assessments of adaptive capacity and thereby the impacts of future climate change.
Insights into the temporal evolution of adaptive capacity can also indicate the
existence of limits to adaptation at a given point in time. Quantification of adaptive
capacity also has practical application in climate impact models. Understanding
governance outlook hence can reveal future challenges in climate change adaptation.
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SSP1 SSP2 SSP3 SSP4 SSP5










Higher education High Medium Low Unequal High
Gender equality
in education High Medium Low
Unequal within
countries High
Table 2.1: Overview of representation of governance and its correlates in the five SSP
scenarios
2.2 Governance in the Shared Socioeconomic Path-
ways
To operationalize and facilitate future climate impact assessments, the Shared-
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) scenarios have been developed. The pathways are
categorized along the assessed challenges to climate mitigation and adaptation.
The five qualitative storylines describe different characteristics of and interactions
between natural resources, economy, demography, lifestyle, human development,
technology and institutions (O’Neill, Kriegler, et al. 2017). The SSPs provide a
framework to assess a wide range of possible futures and societal changes both
between and within countries, and the extent to which these conditions create
challenges to mitigation and adaptation to climate change. Some adaptation-
relevant dimensions including population and education (KC and Lutz 2017),
urbanization (Jiang and O’Neill 2017) and income (Crespo Cuaresma 2017; Dellink
et al. 2017; Leimbach et al. 2017), human development (Crespo Cuaresma and Lutz
2015) and inequality (Rao et al. 2018) have already been quantified in the SSP
framework. A quantification of the SSPs in terms of future governance trajectories,
however, has not yet been realized.
The departure point for the quantification of an indicator of governance along
the five SSPs is the qualitative description in the scenarios’ narratives (O’Neill,
Kriegler, et al. 2017), captured by the characterization of institutions and their
effectiveness as outlined in Table 2.1. SSP1 is the “green road” scenario, which
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envisages a rapid shift to sustainable development, increases in education and
health investments, declining inequality both within and between countries, and
de-emphasis on economic growth and reduction of resource intensity in favor
of improving environmental conditions. Institutions are expected to become
increasingly effective and international cooperation becomes persistent. Such
features make the SSP1 world characterized by low challenges to both climate
mitigation and adaptation as a result of inclusive economic growth and sustainable
welfare. The “middle of the road“ scenario SSP2 is characterized by uneven and
sluggish economic growth and development with slower progress towards achieving
the SDGs. SSP2 does not differ substantially from the present-day trends. SSP2
is largely consistent with historical dynamics, but it takes into account dynamic
relationships among socioeconomic determinants and convergence between countries.
Institutions in SSP2 are modestly effective and uneven. SSP3, also termed the “rocky
road” scenario, expects regional and global conflicts to result from international
fragmentation and inter-country rivalry. Countries are preoccupied with national
goals, which weakens international cooperation. Governance in SSP3 is rather
ineffective and support for international and development institutions is reduced.
“A road divided” or SSP4 presents low challenges to mitigation thanks to global
technological advancement but high challenges to adaptation due to the unequal
distribution of resources both within and across countries. Governance is assumed
to be stronger in high-income regions whilst in low-income regions, basic human
development is neglected and policy implementation is likely to be unsuccessful
due to weak governance. Higher inequalities result in weak representation of the
vulnerable groups and persistence of low levels of development. The SSP3 and SSP4
scenarios present the highest challenges to adaptation, caused by the combination
of slow development, low education, high inequality and weak institutions. Finally,
SSP5 is characterized by development driven by fossil fuel-intensive economies which
enable countries to become richer and more equitable at the price of substantial
environmental degradation. Similar to SSP1, the SSP5 scenario also assumes
improved institutions and rapid human development, particularly for the currently
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disadvantaged populations. However, unlike in SSP1, the nature of the underlying
growth in SSP5 relies heavily on fossil fuel use and results in high challenges to
climate change mitigation (O’Neill, Kriegler, et al. 2017).
2.3 Future pathways of governance
In order to quantify and project governance trajectories along the SSPs scenarios, we
rely on theoretical insights on the determinants of good governance for an empirical
specification. Subsequently, an econometric model is employed to establish a
relationship between governance and countries’ socio-economic indicators of which
projections along the five SSP scenarios are already available. Future projections
of governance evolution within the SSP framework are then derived and can be
used to evaluate the challenges to adaptation together with an internally consistent
set of socioeconomic variables in the SSPs.
Given its breath and depth, governance (a dependent variable in our econometric
model) and its dimensions can be conceptualized in many ways. Here we use the
well-established Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) that provide a composite
index for governance with six sub-categories: voice and accountability, political
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of
corruption. The indicators presented in this database aggregate perceptions of
governance of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents
from 31 different data sources provided by 25 different organizations, and provide a
broad country coverage (Kaufmann 2010). The strength of the WGIs in capturing an
inherently complex concept lays in its many different data sources that summarize
information on the various dimensions of governance, and through averaging the
data on the country level control for the possible idiosyncrasies between sources
(Kaufmann et al. 2007).
The choice of the determinants of good governance (our explanatory variables)
is based on modernization theory which posits that economic and educational
development are central determinants of improvements in the rule of law (Inglehart
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and Welzel 2009; Epstein et al. 2006). There is, in addition, ample empirical
evidence of a causal relationship between female representation in government and
reduced levels of corruption (Jha and Sarangi 2018), as well as a strong connection
between gender empowerment and democracy (Hughes et al. 2014). Within the
SSP framework, economic as well as education trajectories are readily available
(Crespo Cuaresma 2017; KC and Lutz 2017). For gender equality, we use the
difference in mean years of schooling between men and women a proxy variable.
This measure of gender equality arguably represents only one dimension of it, but
gender gaps in education can be credibly taken as indicative of more widespread
gender inequality issues in a society.
The model (see Methods) is estimated using a panel data for 173 countries for the
time period from 1995 to 2015. Although governance indicators at the sub-national
level are available for a few countries, the most granular SSP projections with global
coverage for other socioeconomic variables are only available at the country level,
which also defines our unit of cross-sectional variation.
2.4 Methods
2.4.1 Data
We use the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database, that provides a
composite governance index based six categories: voice and accountability, political
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of
corruption. After standardizing the indicator from its original -2.5 to 2.5 range to
the range from 0 to 1, our main response variable was the arithmetic average of
the six components, referred to as the governance indicator throughout the paper.
Historical GDP per capita is taken from the Penn World Table 7.0 (Heston et al.
2011) and SSP projections from Crespo Cuaresma (2017). Measures of education
(share of population with post-secondary education) and gender equality in education
(difference in mean years of schooling between men and women) come from the
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Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (Wittgenstein
Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital 2021).
2.4.2 Model
The estimation of the effects of the covariates mentioned above on the governance
indicator was carried out using a yearly country-level panel data spanning the
period between 1995 and 2015. Our main specification is as follows:
governancei,t = β1lnGDPpci,t +β2educationi,t+β3genderdifferencei,t+αi+γt+εi,t
where αi controls for time-invariant country-specific characteristics, and γt
accounts for common shocks in the sample in the form of year-fixed effects. Including
fixed effects allows for the presence of omitted factors and long term trends that
might affect both sides of the equation, therefore eliminating bias that might
arise from cross-sectional analyses. We provide additional specifications in Annex
A (Table A.1), and show that our results are robust for within and between-
country regressions underscoring the robustness of our findings also in the light
of cross-national differences.
We project the data forward to the year 2100 by using the coefficient estimates
of the model given by equation (1) and imposing them over the internally consistent
projections of GDP, education and gender gap in education which is given by
the set of existing SSP projections. To remain consistent with the narratives, we
account for the unobserved characteristics captured by the country fixed effects,
which go beyond what can be explained with changes in governance and are likely
to capture further intangible characteristics such as culture, by assuming that
they will change over the long course of the projection period. In other words,
we calculate rates of convergence between countries in line with the narratives
which assume different degrees of reduction of inequality in various socio-economic
characteristics: in SSP 1, all countries converge in 2130 to the 75th percentile
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of the present-day distribution, for SSP2 in 2250, SSP3 assumes no convergence
at all, for SSP4 in 2250, and SSP5 in 2180.
2.4.3 Compositional analysis
The composite nature of our dependent variable (voice and accountability, political
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of
corruption) allows for the investigation of whether some of the dimensions stand
out in their relationship with the covariates. We treated our governance variable
with an isometric-log transformation (van den Boogaart and Tolosana-Delgado
2013), and subsequently regressed it against our covariates. This process yields
weights within each covariate that relate to each of the dimensions of the governance
index, thereby disentangling the extent to which each of the covariates relates to
the components of the governance indicator.
In our analysis of the composite Worldwide Governance Index (comprising six
dimension of governance), we find a distinct relationship between post-secondary
education and two dimensions of the dependent variable: control of corruption
and government effectiveness (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A). This effect is not
surprising and presents additional evidence concerning the importance of education
(post-secondary education) for better institutions and demand for eradication of
corruption (Lutz, Cuaresma, et al. 2010). Based on this finding, we separately
project indicators of corruption and government effectiveness, thereby capturing
the effect of different rate of change of educational expansion across the scenarios
(see Figures A.2-A.5 in Appendix A).
Our econometric analysis shows that the aggregate governance indicator from
the WGI database (Kaufmann 2010) can be well predicted using GDP per capita,
the share of population with higher education and the gender gap in mean years
of schooling (see Table A.1 in Appendix A). The estimated elasticities linking the
variables in the specification to changes in governance indicators appear robust
to changes in the modelling strategy. The estimates obtained from the model
are then combined with the available country-level indicators of socio-economic
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of governance over the 21st century. The 2015 values of the
normalized composite world governance indicator (WGI) in 2015 are shown in a), overlaid
with the scenario dependent evolution of governance for selected countries over the 21st
century. The governance indicator is normalized to a range from 0 to 1, with higher
values indicating better governance. The global distribution of future governance in 2050
is depicted for different SSPs ranging from a ‘sustainable future’ (SSP1, b) to a ‘middle
of the road’ scenario (SSP2, c) and a ‘rocky road’ scenario characterized by unequal
development and regional rivalry (SSP3, d).
performance within the SSP framework to calculate projections of the governance
indicators over the 21st century.
In line with the SSP narratives, future projections of governance show distinct
differences between the scenarios (Figure 2.1). For developed countries such as
Germany or Japan, whether the country follows the most or the least progressive
scenario makes only a minor difference for the dynamics of the projected governance
indicator since their score remains very high in all scenarios. For less well-off
countries, however, the path of the socio-economic development is decisive for how
governance is expected to evolve (Figure 2.1 b,c,d): for countries like Somalia or
Nigeria, the difference between following the SSP1 (“green road”) and SSP3 (“rocky
road”) could result in anything from stagnation to trifold improvement.
Under the SSP3 scenario, little improvement in governance is projected globally
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over the 21st century. In contrast, substantial progress already by mid-century is
evident under the SSP1 scenario which envisages a sustainable future. Similarities
between SSP1 and SSP5 arise as a result of the almost identical representation
of governance in the original storylines, which is reproduced in our projections.
Although the development narrative and resulting climate mitigation challenges in
SSP1 and SSP5 differ fundamentally, their socio-economic development trajectories
are remarkably similar. SSP4 on the other hand, yields results that are in between
SSP2 and SSP3. Because of these similarities, in two of the figures we report
results for only for SSP1, SSP2 and SSP3.
There is no rule of thumb for which levels of this indicator represent ‘good’
governance. In fact, any such categorization arguably also includes value judgement.
For the sake of illustrating the changes over the 21st century, however, we introduce
percentile categories based on the 2015 distribution of the governance scores (see
Figure 2.2). A clear scenario dependence for projected governance is apparent at
a country level (Figure 2.2 a-c). The differences are even more striking when we
consider the implications for future populations in countries with different governance
regimes (Figure 2.2 d-f). Many countries whose populations are projected to grow
substantially are expected to undergo transition and improve their governance over
the coming decades, i.e. from “weak” to “medium”, or further. Under the rapid
development scenarios such as SSP1 and SSP5, this implies that only a small number
of countries will be characterized by very weak or weak governance (defined as the
state of a country below the median of the governance indicator today) and almost
all countries may reach states of good governance by the end of the century. In
contrast, countries that are home to around 3 (5) billion people in 2050 (2100), will
continue to be characterized by weak governance under the SSP3 scenario (Figure
2.2). Even under a middle-of-the-road SSP2 scenario, about 1.5 billion people will
be living in about 40 countries characterized by weak governance by mid-century.
The projection exercise combines short to medium-term dynamic adjustments
based on the estimated relationships (and thus extrapolated using the correlation
structures found in historical data) with assumption-driven long term developments
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Figure 2.2: Projections of governance in countries grouped by income and population-
specific projections. a-c, The number of countries per SSP in different governance categories
for 2015, 2050 and 2100, respectively. The governance indicator is normalized with 0
indicating very low levels of governance across all indicators and 1 indicating very high
levels (Kaufmann 2010). For illustration purposes, we introduce the following percentile-
based categorization based on the 2015 governance scores : very good (>90th percentile),
good (75 - 90), medium (50 - 74), weak (25 - 49), very weak (<25th percentile).d-f,
Estimated population living in countries with different governance levels for 2015, 2050
and 2100. Total population size differ as a result of the diverging projections of future
population under different SSPs.
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that ensure the internal consistency of the trajectories with respect to the SSP
narratives. Throughout the paper we report results solely for the aggregate
governance indicator. However, the projections of the individual dimensions of
the indicator can also be used if found to be particularly relevant for the socio-
economic issue or a policy objective in focus. Based on our compositional analysis
of the governance indicator, adjusted estimates of the effects of socioeconomic
developments on particular components of the governance indicator are calculated
to provide projections of specific subcomponents such as corruption or governance
effectiveness (see Methods and Supplementary Information). This makes our results
applicable to a wide range of issues under consideration in policy agendas related
to sustainable development and climate actions.
It is important to highlight that our approach does not imply a direction of causal
linkages. Improvements in governance in the context of sustainable development can
lead to a virtuous cycle between governance and development, rather than showing
a cause-and-effect relationship (Kraay and Kaufmann 2002). Since the focus of
our model is not to unveil the causal effects, but rather to consistently extend the
SSPs, such potential mutually re-enforcing dynamics only further underscore the
need for an integration of governance into the SSP framework.
2.5 Importance of near-term improvements in gov-
ernance
In a world with near-term sustainable development targets and ongoing climate
change, the temporal evolution of our governance indicators is of particular interest.
We find that countries characterized by very weak governance, albeit starting from
a low level, have an up to five times higher rate of improvement in scenarios of
rapid socio-economic development under SSP1 and SSP5 compared to SSP3 (Figure
2.3). The absolute values for countries in the ‘medium’ category is considerably
smaller, although differences between the scenarios are still evident (up to a factor
of four between SSP1 and SSP3). Over time, countries move out of the lower
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Figure 2.3: Rates of change of governance. Box-Whisker diagram of the five-year rates
of change in governance for different SSPs over the 21st century. The lower and upper
hinges correspond to the first and third quartiles (the 25th and 75th percentiles). The
upper whisker extends from the hinge to the highest value that is within 1.5 x interquartile
range of the hinge. Data beyond the end of the whiskers are outliers and plotted as
points. Panels separate out the evolution for country groupings classified by their state of
governance (time-dependent). For SSP 1, no countries will be in the ‘very weak’ category
after 2030 (2050) following high rates of improvement in governance in the preceding
decades. SSP 4 and 5 are omitted from the figure for clarity.
categories, and their rates of change reduce as they improve governance. Our
analysis suggests a window of opportunity to eradicate lowest levels of governance
in the near term. This highlights the importance of achieving the goals under
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to facilitate long-term sustainable
development, particularly for the countries characterized by the lowest levels of
development to date.
2.6 Governance and adaptation to climate change
Adaptation is multi-faceted and sector-dependent. As both the integral part of
sustainable development and a stand-alone mechanism in coping with climate
change, adaptive capacity is difficult to measure because of the volatile nature of its
many determinants. Successful adaptation will depend in part on the timescales of
improvement of socio-economic factors many of which are now available in the SSP
framework. The existing projections including that of governance can subsequently
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Figure 2.4: Projections of the ND GAIN Adaptation Readiness score. Trajectories for
India, Somalia and Syria are shown for different SSPs. The projections of the Adaptation
Readiness score are based on our projections of future governance. The shaded region
marks the range of the readiness indicator for categories ‘good’ and ‘very good’ in 2015
(0.52-0.80). For global projections see in Annex 1, Figures 6 and 7.
be used for designing an overarching framework to evaluate more granular and
sector-specific measurements of adaptive capacity.
Across all scales, however, a key determinant is the ability to effectively
leverage private and public sector investment for adaptation actions. This is
coined “adaptation readiness” in the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-
GAIN) (Chen et al. 2015), a summary indicator of countries’ vulnerability to climate
change. The concept of adaptation readiness can also be seen as an indication
for countries’ absorptive capacities of international climate finance channeled, for
instance, through the Green Climate Fund (Brechin and Espinoza 2017). If the
readiness is low, successful adaptation financing and implementation is questionable.
Governance is indeed a key ingredient in the ND-GAIN readiness score. Given the
high correlation of the readiness score with our governance indicator (0.93, p =
0.000), our projections thereby allow us to deduce the future trajectories of the
ND-GAIN readiness score in line with the different SSP scenarios.
The range of adaptation readiness spanned by the member states of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) today match
well with our ‘good’ and ‘very good’ categories. Most developing countries, however,
will barely, if at all, reach levels of ‘good’ adaptation readiness by mid-century, even
under the optimistic scenarios SSP1 and SSP5 (Figure 2.4). Under SSP3 and SSP4,
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little to no improvement in adaptation readiness is apparent, with an ever increasing
number of people living in countries with low adaptive capacity (see Figures A.6
and A.7 in Annex A). Our results are fully in line with the qualitative classification
of adaptation challenges in the SSP scenarios: low challenges in SSP1 and SSP5;
and high challenges in SSP 3 and SSP4 (O’Neill, Kriegler, et al. 2017). However,
we also show that ‘low challenges’ are not equivalent to ‘no challenges’. Even under
SSP 1, adaptive capacity will only increase gradually over the next decades while
an adaptation deficit to present day climate is already apparent (Lobell and Tebaldi
2014). To that end, our results also illustrate what could be considered an ‘upper
limit’ of the future evolution of adaptive capacity.
2.7 Timescales of governance and climate change
The recent IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (IPCC 2018) has
underscored the substantial differences in climate impacts between 1.5°C and 2°C
that could materialize already before mid-century. Tropical regions will be bearing
the brunt of these differences (Schleussner, Lissner, et al. 2016; Schleussner, Deryng,
et al. 2018; King and Harrington 2018) and will also be the regions where the
anthropogenic climate change is emerging the fastest against the background of
natural variability (King, Black, et al. 2016). Thereby, while vulnerable countries
will be striving for sustainable development and improving their adaptive capacity,
climate impacts will continue to intensify. Our results show that even under
scenarios of rapid and sustainable development (SSP1 and SSP5), improvements
of adaptive capacity will take on average at least three decades. This indicates
that (temporal) limits to improvements in adaptive capacity may persist during the
21st century leading to elevated risks and impacts of climate change in countries
with low socio-economic development. Climate impacts that exceed the limits to
adaptation will result in climate-related loss and damage (Mace and Verheyen 2016;
Serdeczny et al. 2017; James et al. 2015). Given that negative climate impacts
can hamper countries’ abilities to achieve sustainable development, and thereby
improving adaptive capacity, our results indicate that adequate responses and
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support schemes for loss and damage will be crucial policy instruments to support
vulnerable countries (Thomas and Benjamin 2017).
Country-level representation of governance does have several limitations. The
methodological framework used for the projection exercise presented in this study
can be complemented with methods to downscale global assumptions and estimates.
Scenario narratives and local interpretations of the SSPs can be derived from
qualitative methods. The analytical methods employed to provide inference on
the drivers of institutional change rely on the assumption of a common response
of the governance indicators to their determinants across countries. Combining
the advantages of a global analytical model of governance dynamics such as the
one presented here with those of a narrative based on a qualitative context-specific
assessment of future governance changes can improve the quality of our projections
further. Such an extension of our analysis appears particularly important for
countries for which the existing data are missing or not reliable, as well as for
countries where disruptive changes in the current institutional setting are likely in
the future. To address the issue of internal inequalities and sub-national specificities,
we here have to rely on our indicator’s multiple sources and dimensions. An analysis
incorporating sub-national information is a promising research avenue. Further
unobserved differences between countries are controlled for in our model by using
country-specific fixed effects, and global trends by yearly fixed effects.
The SSP narrative framework by design does not incorporate feedbacks of climate
impacts. This is important to keep in mind, particularly in the context of high
warming scenarios or in scenarios with persistently low levels of development in some
regions of the world. Even under the SSP3 scenario, no country is projected to see a
decline in socio-economic development. This ‘scenario optimism’ can stand in stark
contrast to the observed dynamics, where in reality some countries such as Syria
have experienced rapid decline in stability over the past recent years (Figure 2.1 a).
The dynamics behind such deteriorations are difficult to incorporate in deterministic
modelling approaches underlying the SSPs, which represents a limitation of scenario
frameworks in general. While conflicts are context-dependent and not deterministic,
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some key determinants of conflict risks can be linked to the SSP pathways and
indicate increasing globally increasing conflict risks for SSP3 and SSP4 centered in
Central and South Asia as well as Africa (Hegre et al. 2016). Considering such risks
would lead to considerably higher probabilities for a deterioration of governance
under those scenarios, thereby painting a more accurate, but even bleaker picture
compared to the sustainable development scenarios.
Uncertainties related to trajectories of future vulnerability have been found to
dominate climate impacts in the near term (Hallegatte et al. 2015), but will also
shape the end-of-century climate impacts (Hinkel, Vuuren, et al. 2012). Climate-
related natural disasters displace millions (Heslin et al. 2019) already today, cause
multi-billion dollar damages (Munich Re 2018) and may even contribute to increased
risks of armed conflict outbreaks (Schleussner, Lissner, et al. 2016) and exacerbate
forced migration (Abel et al. 2019). Projections of future economic impacts of
climate change indicate non-linear increases in damages, which are most pronounced
for tropical countries (Burke, Hsiang, et al. 2015). Thereby, integrating climate
change impacts into SSP trajectories would affect the global trajectories of socio-
economic development, in particular for high emission scenarios. To do so, however,
requires an improved understanding of the prospects of future adaptation. The
projections of governance and adaptive capacity provided here contribute to closing
this gap. Our study thus presents a step forward towards a more integrated scenario
perspective to inform global policies aimed at achieving sustainable development.
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Abstract
Gender inequalities are reflected in differential vulnerability and exposure to the
hazards posed by climate change and addressing them is key to increase the adaptive
capacities of societies. We provide trajectories of the Gender Inequality Index (GII)
alongside the Shared-Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), a scenario framework widely
used in climate science. Here we find that rapid improvements in gender inequality
are possible under a sustainable development scenario already in the near-term.
The share of girls growing up in countries with the highest gender inequality could
be reduced to 24% in 2030 compared to about 70% today. Largely overcoming
gender inequality as assessed in the GII would be within reach by mid-century.
Under less optimistic scenarios, gender inequality may persist throughout the 21st
century. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating gender in scenarios
assessing future climate impacts and underscore the relevance of addressing gender




Differential risks to climate change impacts are shaped by variations in vulnerability
and exposure within and across societies. Together with their biophysical determi-
nants, vulnerability and exposure are products of unevenly distributed socioeconomic
development and multidimensional inequality (Klein et al. 2014). Inequalities are
reflected in income and wealth, which remain central subjects of socioeconomic
research, but also in gender, education, racial and ethnic profiles (Mcdowell et al.
2016). Socially marginalized groups are often affected by the interplay of these
different dimensions and are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.
A growing body of literature points at the facets of differential vulnerability and
exposure to the impacts of climate change across genders, stressing that women are
not inherently more at risk, but that intersections between gender, power dynamics,
socio-economic structures and societal expectations result in climate impacts being
experienced very differently by women (Djoudi et al. 2016). Research has also
highlighted missed opportunities for action when women’s agency in policy and
decision making is not fully seized (Olsson et al. 2014). In our contribution, we focus
on the role of gender inequality, which despite its prominence as a cross-cutting
theme in the sustainable development discourse, lacks concrete operationalizations
in the analysis of future impacts of climate change and the extent to which these
can still be avoided (Pearse 2017).
Current and future damages of climate change are tied to the ability with
which affected regions and populations adapt to changing conditions. In the
risk framework of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the United Nations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), vulnerability to climate
change impacts is inextricably linked to adaptive capacity, which is defined as “the
ability of systems, institutions, humans, and other organisms to adjust to potential
damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to respond to consequences” (IPCC
2014). Adaptive capacity, in turn, hinges on a range of socioeconomic factors, gender
inequality playing one of the central roles, particularly in areas most vulnerable
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to climate change. The linkages between gender inequality and adaptive capacity
range from uneven access to resources, to cultural norms and entrenched social
structures (Rao 2017; Alston 2013).
Accounting for gender inequality and its possible future trajectories in the assess-
ment of the pathways of adaptive capacity adds another layer to the identification
of societal climate impact hotspots – areas where expected biophysical impacts
intersect with socioeconomic vulnerability (Schleussner, Lissner, et al. 2016; Byers
et al. 2018). In this paper, we present an extension of the set of socioeconomic
scenarios – the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (O’Neill, Kriegler, et al.
2017) – with an indicator of gender inequality, the Gender Inequality Index (GII)
(UNDP 2018) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The SSPs
are a widely used toolkit in climate change research and provide a basis for the
operationalization of indicators of gender inequality in integrated assessments.
The GII used here to reflect gender inequality consists of three dimensions:
health (maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates), educational and
political empowerment (male to female ratio in parliamentary seats and secondary
education) and participation in the labor market (male to female ratio in labor force
participation rates, see the Methods section for additional details on the indicator)
(UNDP 2018). We collected the individual components from their respective original
sources and reconstructed the index following the approach laid out in the Technical
Notes of the Human Development Report (UNDP 2018). This reconstruction
produced more complete time series than those available hitherto (see Figure B.1
in Appendix B). The index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values reflecting higher
levels of inequality between men and women.
The multi-faceted nature of gender inequality at all levels of socio-economic
development makes aggregation into indicator a complex exercise. Unsurprisingly,
most indicators (including the GII), face justified criticism (Permanyer 2013; Beneria
and Permanyer 2010) (see the Methods section for an extended discussion). We
consider the dimensions covered in the GII to describe necessary conditions of
gender inequality, while acknowledging that they are not sufficient to characterize
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Figure 3.1: Gender Inequality Index (GII) - correlation with vulnerability and climate
actions. a, GII vs. vulnerability component of the ND-GAIN index (country-level estimates
for 2017). b, GII (country-level average 2005-2010) vs. CLIMI (country communications
of climate policies between 2005 and 2010).
gender inequality across all the dimensions that contribute to it. In the light
of these caveats, overcoming the inequality dimensions covered in the GII does
not automatically mean that universal gender equality is achieved, and we do
not assert that any country in the world can claim to have achieved full gender
equality to date or in the near future. It is important to keep these limitations
in mind when interpreting the results.
The ramifications of gender inequality for addressing climate change can be
regarded through two lenses: women’s differential vulnerability and adaptive
capacity; and the role of women in mitigation and adaptation actions. To illustrate
the importance of accounting for gender inequality in both adaptation and mitigation
of climate change, we correlate the GII with an adaptation- and a mitigation-relevant
metrics (compare Figure 3.1).
Previous research shows that the gender-differentiated vulnerability to climate
change is most pronounced in agriculture (Caretta and Börjeson 2015; Su et
al. 2017) and water (Sinharoy and Caruso 2019; Sultana 2018) sectors, natural
disasters (Neumayer and Pluemper 2007), reproductive health (Sorensen et al. 2018),
mental health and well-being (Castañeda Carney et al. 2020). We use a broad
measure of climate change vulnerability of the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index
(ND-GAIN) (Chen et al. 2015), a widely used summary measure of a country’s
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vulnerability to climate change and its readiness to improve resilience (for more
applications, see (Adams et al. 2018; Robinson and Dornan 2017; Lesnikowski, Ford,
Berrang-Ford, Barrera, and Heymann 2013). Figure 3.1a depicts the correlation
between the GII and the ND-GAIN vulnerability indicator (consisting of six life-
supporting sectors: food, water, health, ecosystem services, human habitat and
infrastructure), and depicts a strong positive relationship between the two variables.
At the same time, a strand of research suggests that women’s representation
in politics leads to more stringent climate action (Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi
2019; McKinney and Fulkerson 2015), thus making a case for consideration of
mainstreaming gender equality in mitigation. More broadly, female participation
in decision-making is closely linked to various facets of socioeconomic progress:
from higher spending on health and education to better quality of institutions,
democracy and higher economic growth (Lutz, Cuaresma, et al. 2010; Mavisakalyan
2014; Clots-Figueras 2012; Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi 2019). Following a recent
approach (Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi 2019), in Figure 3.1b we correlate the GII
with the Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures Index (CLIMI) (Steves and
Teytelboym 2013), an measure of climate change mitigation policies set by countries
(for more applications, see Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013)). The correlation
of the two indices suggests that low levels of gender inequality tend to occur
in parallel to high levels of climate action, which corroborates previous research
(Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi 2019).
Results and discussion While the importance of rapid and stringent mitigation
cannot be overemphasized, and recent research insights provide indications that
gender equality facilitates climate action, here we focus on the importance of
gender equality for adaptive capacity and vulnerability to climate change. To
this end, we expand the scenario space of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways
(SSPs), with the intention of improving the understanding of adaptation challenges
under different socio-economic conditions. The SSPs are scenarios that explore
a range of possible futures that illustrate how socio-economic conditions might
change over the next century and what implications these conditions may have for
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climate change adaptation and mitigation. SSPs quantify five different narratives of
socio-economic futures to operationalize them for climate change research (O’Neill,
Kriegler, et al. 2017) – they are a widely used tool in climate research community,
indispensable for integrated assessments of the dynamics between socioeconomic
and climate change variables, and are also the scenario framework used in the
Sixth Assessment report of the IPCC.
SSP1, the ‘sustainability’ scenario, is characterized by low challenges to mit-
igation and adaptation, a result of increased investments in education, health,
renewable energy sources and declining inequalities between and within countries,
thus limiting impacts and increasing adaptive capacity. SSP2, the ‘middle of the
road’ scenario, maintains premediated challenges to adaptation and mitigation, and
is a pathway of uneven and slower socioeconomic progress, compatible with the
continuation of historical trends. SSP3 is characterized by high challenges to both
mitigation and adaptation, which are a product of a growing divergence between
economies, weak international cooperation and increase in internal and international
conflicts. SSP4, the scenario of ‘inequality’, leads to low challenges for mitigation,
due to technological advancements in high income countries, but high challenges
for adaptation, because of an unequal distribution of advancements and resources
across countries. Finally, SSP5 is similar to SSP1 in the fast socioeconomic progress
on all fronts, but with the major difference of the progress being powered by fossil
fuels, which produces substantially higher emissions and resulting climate impacts.
So far, the SSPs storylines have been quantified in future trajectories of income
(Crespo Cuaresma 2017; Dellink et al. 2017), population (KC and Lutz 2017),
education (KC and Lutz 2017), urbanization (Jiang and O’Neill 2017), the Human
Development Index (Crespo Cuaresma and Lutz 2015), inequality (Rao et al. 2018)
and governance (Andrijevic, Crespo Cuaresma, et al. 2020a). Gender inequality
is qualitatively featured in the scenarios’ storylines focusing on the demographic
and human development elements (see Table 3.1 (O’Neill, Kriegler, et al. 2017)),
and is to a certain extent reflected in the measures of discrepancies in educational
attainment between men and women in the population projections by age and sex
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SSP1 SSP2 SSP3 SSP4 SSP5
Gender
Inequality Low Medium High
High in LICs,
low in HICs High
Table 3.1: Representation of gender inequality in SSP storylines. (HIC/LIC: High/Low
Income Countries).
(KC and Lutz 2017). Our contribution provides projections of gender inequality,
as quantified by the GII, which are compatible with the SSP scenarios described
above and thus provide a new dimension to the assessment of potential future
climate change adaptation pathways.
To achieve an internally consistent extension of the SSPs, we use the existing
indicators under the SSP framework to analyze past trends and project future
dynamics of gender equality. Our results indicate that past trends in the GII can
be robustly explained by the dynamics of GDP per capita, population with post-
secondary education and the gender gap in mean years of schooling after controlling
for country-specific equilibria and global trends (see Methods for regression results
and Supplementary Material for a sensitivity analysis). As is the case within the
methodological framework of the SSPs, the projections of the GII are not to be
interpreted as predictions, but as quantifications of narrative-driven scenarios.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Data
Gender Inequality Index (GII): the analysis in this paper is based on the GII,
produced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2018). It
integrates measures of reproductive health (maternal mortality ratio, adolescent
birth rate), empowerment (secondary education, parliamentary seats) and labor
market outputs (labor force participation rate).
The GII has been criticized on several grounds (Permanyer 2013; Klasen 2017),
with key issues relating to its functional form (which is asserted to be unnecessarily
complex and difficult to interpret); the health dimension of the index variables
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not having a male equivalent (unlike the dimensions of economic, political and
labor market metrics); and the potential penalization of poor countries owing to
the possibility that poor reproductive health is a result of general poverty rather
than gender inequality. Attempts have been made to simplify the index and make
its interpretation more intuitive, though no clear consensus on how exactly the
adapted indicator should look like has been reached, and to our best knowledge,
the UNDP has not made any amends to the index so far.
The criticism about the penalization of less developed countries is concerned
with the indicator’s health dimensions (i.e. maternal mortality and adolescent
birth rates), which could be caused by poverty rather than gender inequality,
thereby obscuring the implications of this dimension. The very rationale behind
accounting for maternal mortality and adolescent birth rate as a dimension of
gendered health inequality stems from the fact that poor maternal health sets
women back uniquely, irrespective of the reason and without an equivalent risk for
men, and as such arguably contributes to gender inequality. Reducing maternal
mortality and adolescent pregnancy are also among the targets of the Sustainable
Development Goal 5 on gender equality (UN General Assembly 2015). Additionally,
recent applications found that the GII explains variance in child malnutrition and
mortality in low and middle-income countries with similar income levels (Marphatia
et al. 2016),implying that there the index does provide information on the variation
of gender inequality across countries beyond that contained in GDP per capita
differences. Finally, the fact that reproductive health is strongly affected by climate
change impacts such as extreme heat is particularly relevant for the projection
exercise presented here, and as such merits consideration as an own standing
dimension of climate adaptation (Bekkar et al. 2020).
Further support for the GII’s reflection of a broader understanding of gender
inequality can be found in studies where it is found to correlate with other
manifestations of gender inequality that go beyond what is included in the calculation
of the index, such as the suicide gender ratio (Chang et al. 2019), adolescent dating
violence (Gressard et al. 2015) and intimate partner violence (Redding et al. 2017).
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3.2.2 Alternative indicators of gender equality
Alternative indicators available in the literature incorporate different aspects of
gender inequality. In the following, three other indicators will be introduced and
examined in relation to the GII.
Gender Development Index (GDI): The GDI (UNDP 2018) is designed within
the Human Development Reports provided by the United Nations Development
Programme. Similarly to the Gender Inequality Index, it accounts for metrics
of health, education and economic empowerment. The economic component of
the index is difficult to reconstruct due to the scarcity of data on the wage gap
between women and men, which is necessary for the calculation of the overall index.
Additionally, variation between countries is not as large as in the GII index, and
the GDI does not capture basic metrics such as maternal and adolescent health,
which are relevant for climate change vulnerability. The correlation of the GDI
with the GII is depicted in Figure 5a.
Women, Peace and Security Index (WPS): The WPS is provided by the
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and index captures three
dimensions: inclusion (economic, social, political), justice (formal laws and informal
discrimination) and security (violence, safety). Even though this index incorporates
dimensions of high relevance for climate change-related vulnerability (particularly
violence), it is only available at two points in time and is therefore suboptimal
for the estimation of the historical response function that underpins our analysis.
However, it is highly correlated to the GII used in this paper (see Figure 3.2b).
Global Gender Gap Index (GGI): produced by the World Economic Forum,
the GGI (World Economic Forum 2018) incorporates four dimensions: economic
participation, educational attainment, health and survival and political empow-
erment. The dimensions are represented by 14 different indicators. Compared
to the GII used in this analysis, the GGI contains similar dimensions and there
are overlaps among the underlying indicators to the GII used in this analysis,
while the major difference is in the health component, where the GII considers
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of the GII and other indices of gender equality. Correlation
coefficient (R) and the statistical significance (p) are provided for the relationship between
GII and a, Gender Development Index, b, Women, Peace and Security Index and c,
Gender Gap index.
maternal mortality and adolescent pregnancy, while the GGG takes into account
life expectancy. Similarly to other indices, the time series of GGG is shorter than
that of the GII. The GGI has the lowest (albeit statistically significant) correlation
coefficient with the GII (Figure 3.2c).
3.2.3 Gender equality indicators and climate adaptation
Compared to other commonly used indicators including the Gender Development
Index (UNDP 2018), the Gender Empowerment Measure (World Economic Forum
2018), and the Women, Peace and Security Index, we find that the GII is particularly
indicative of hindered adaptive capacity in many climate-vulnerable countries, since
its dimensions (such as maternal health, participation in economic and political
life) point at the very basic disempowerment of women that directly reduces their
capacity to adapt to climate change. The GII is also more holistic in its economic
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dimension, by considering education and labor force participation rather than
income, since the data on gender gap in earned income tends to be problematic
(Bardhan and Klasen 1999). In addition, the construction of the GII precludes the
different dimensions of the indicator from compensating for each other (i.e. poor
performance in one dimension cannot be compensated for with higher performance in
another dimension in GII). A more in-depth qualitative and quantitative comparison
is provided below.While this is beyond the scope of this paper, application of our
analytical framework to different indicators of gender inequality and analyzing the
effect of the choice of the indicator on projections could be a fruitful research avenue.
Following the approach laid out in the Technical Notes of the Human Develop-
ment Report (2018), we reconstructed the GII with the same underlying indicators,
with the aim of obtaining more complete time series than those available hitherto.
The data are available for majority of countries and can be reconstructed back
to 1995 (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B). To capitalize on data availability and
completeness, we use the same source indicators except for the education component,
which we source from the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human
Capital (KC and Lutz 2017) for better consistency with the projections that follow
in the second stage of the analysis. The calculation of inequality uses an association-
sensitive method, with geometric means of the three dimensions calculated for each
gender separately, and then aggregated across genders using a harmonic mean. For
comparison of the reconstructed GII and the data provided through the UNDP
website, see Figure B.1 in Appendix B. Data analysis and projections were done
using R software version 1.3.1073.
3.2.4 Model
To analyze the relationship between gender inequality and other socio-economic
dimensions, we use a simple econometric model that expresses the GII as a function
of GDP per capita, the share of population with higher education and the difference
in mean years of schooling between men and women, and accounts for country-
specific time-invariant characteristics using fixed effects. The model is aimed at
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replicating long-run dynamics in GII, with the theoretical underpinning that trends
in socioeconomic variables correlate with the changes observed in gender inequality
over long periods of time. From an econometric point of view, it can be considered
a cointegration relationship posing common trends in gender inequality, income
and human capital indicators around a country-specific equilibrium.
Prior to the analysis, the GII is transformed to account for the bounded nature
of the index, which is defined between 0 and 1. The variable used in the panel
regression models is given by GII∗ = log( GIIi,t1−GIIi,t ), where GIIi,t is the original
Gender Inequality Index for country i in period tt. Our basic specification is given by:
GIIi,t = β1 ln (GDP pc)i,t + β2educationi,t + β3educationgapi,t + αi + εi,t
where αi captures country fixed effects and εi,t is the error term, assumed to
be stationary. Several robustness checks carried out by changing the specification
can be found in Table B.1 in Appendix B.
Projections for the 21st century are carried out by combining the parameter
estimates from the specification given by equation (1) with the existing projections of
GDP (Crespo Cuaresma 2017), population by age, sex and education (KC and Lutz
2017) and gender gap in education (KC and Lutz 2017) thereby remaining internally
consistent with the SSP scenario framework and providing direct comparability with
the rest of the socioeconomic projections existing. The SSP population projections
(KC and Lutz 2017) were employed to derive the proportion of women experiencing
different levels of gender inequality in the future at the global level. We split
the population of women into two age groups: 0-14 and 15+. The thresholds
for dividing the distribution of GII are based on the levels of gender inequality
currently in the OECD countries (0.002 – 0.315).
3.3 Results
Our projection exercise shows that major improvements in terms of overcoming
gender inequality are achieved worldwide by mid-century under the SSP 1 scenario
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of the GII over the 21st century - regional outlook. Historical
values of the GII index and projections over five SSP scenarios, averaged by world region.
(Figure 3.3c). Significant improvements happen following the SSP2 (Figure 3.3d)
pathway, though with notable exceptions in the most vulnerable parts of the world.
In the SSP3 world (Figure 3.3e), however, only marginal progress is made in parts
of Latin America, while in Sub Saharan Africa gender inequality is projected to
deteriorate (compare Figure 3.3e).
Given the central role that gender equality has for adaptive capacity, the future
outlook concerning how well a country or a region can cope with the impacts of
climate change can be very different depending on the scenario of socio-economic
development. Across all world regions, improvements in gender equality in inclusive
high-development pathways (SSP1, 5) are most pronounced in the near-term until
mid-century. Note that the trajectories for SSPs 1 and 5 largely overlap due to
similar levels of the underlying dimensions that gender inequality is a function of
(education, GDP and gender gap in mean years of schooling). The summary of
regional levels of gender inequality in Figure 3.3 reflects the severity of the difference
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Figure 3.4: Share of women affected by gender inequality globally in 2020 and 2030.
GII values for 2020 and projections for 2030 are divided in two groups. The division
is based is based on the present-day range of GII in the OECD countries (0.001-0.312),
which splits the countries in GII <= 0.3 and GII > 0.3. The GII estimates are coupled
with population projections disaggregated by female population projections for two broad
age groups: a, 0-14 years and b, older than 15.
in levels of the GII, and the importance of near-term improvements for less well-off
regions. As it is the case for other indicators of socio-economic development (Crespo
Cuaresma and Lutz 2015; Andrijevic, Crespo Cuaresma, et al. 2020a), the rates of
improvement in the GII towards gender equality are highest up to 2050 in these
scenarios. Less optimistic development pathways show a linear continuation of
current trends or even a slow-down. Note that, by design, the SSPs do not allow
for a systematic long-run deterioration of socio-economic indicators.
In the wider context of sustainable development – still inextricably linked to
the climate change problem – the gender dimension is a crucial policy component,
including as a stand-alone item under the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
of the United Nations’ 2030 agenda. SDG 5 strives to “achieve gender equality
and empower all women and girls” (UN General Assembly 2015), and the progress
towards the multiple goals under SDG 5 is tracked with a set of individual indicators.
The Gender Inequality Index presented here is a more holistic measure than the
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specific indicators used in monitoring SDG 5. With its dimensions related to
reproductive health and decision-making, as well as political and employment
participation, it relates to underlying structural issues determining gender inequality
(United Nations 2019). As such, the GII and its projections can be a useful tool
to assess how the very basic conditions for making progress on SDG 5 vary in
different socioeconomic futures.
Many of the countries experiencing high levels of gender inequality are in
the mid-stages of the demographic transition (Willekens 2016), implying that
their populations are expected to substantially grow in the next decades. Such a
demographic development exposes young women to slow improvements in health, as
well as to unequal opportunities in education and employment. Given the relatively
high life expectancy of women born today, the level of gender inequality they are
exposed to in the next decade will affect a cohort who will shape most of the
21st century. Figure 3.4 illustrates the opportunities for near-term improvements
of gender inequality: already in 2030, the fraction of young girls growing up in
environments of lower gender inequality (the present-day range of the GII in OECD
countries) can be more than 2.5 times larger in a pathway such as SSP1, where
rates of population growth slow down and socioeconomic progress speeds up. On
the other hand, scenario SSP3 virtually retains the present global distribution
of our gender inequality indicator, due to faster population growth and slower
and uneven socioeconomic development up to 2030. This underscores how rapid
improvements towards achieving gender equality in the near-term would be possible,
in line with the goals of the SDG 5. Note that for reasons of brevity we here
show only scenarios 1-3, which encompass the full range of the five scenarios, and
exhibit large differences between each other.
Our analysis outlines potential future gender inequality pathways under different
scenarios of socio-economic development outlined in the SSPs. Our projections
show that SSP1 results in major improvements in gender equality on a global scale
while SSP2 shows some significant improvements but with notable exceptions in
the most vulnerable regions, including Africa. In contrast, in the SSP3 world,
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gender inequality at the global level is either only marginally reduced or, in some
cases, intensified. We show how such pathways may achieve concrete near-term
improvements in the gender inequality environment for girls in the coming decade
or may contribute to maintaining the status quo. The environments of gender
inequality have significant implications for the growing global population, whose
actions affect achievement of the SDGs. As a crucial component of adaptive
capacity, gender inequality also plays a decisive role in allowing populations to
adapt to increasing climate impacts. Overcoming gender inequality is a cornerstone
of climate resilient development – and improvements may have far-reaching benefits
for adaptation and mitigation alike. Achieving climate resilience has to be designed
in a way that not only prevents further erosion of gender equality, but actively
works towards it, thereby reducing vulnerability and providing an empowering
environment for strengthening women’s agency.
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Abstract
The extent to which societies will globally be able to adapt to climate change
is not well understood. Here we analyze socioeconomic dimensions of adaptive
capacity of populations to deal with heat stress and find income, urbanization and
income inequality to be important factors in explaining adaptation to heat stress
with air conditioning. Using the scenario framework of the Shared Socioeconomic
Pathways, we estimate the future cooling gap, which represents the difference
between the population exposed to heat stress and the population with access to
air conditioning. Depending on the scenario of socioeconomic development, total
population affected by the cooling gap may vary between 2 billion (SSP1) and
5.2 billion (SSP3) people in 2050. Our analysis shows vast regional inequalities in
adaptive capacity for one of the most universal manifestations of climate change,
which underscores the need for considering of the degree of adaptive capacity in
assessments of climate change impacts.
68
4. Cooling gap in Shared Socioeconomic Pathways
4.1 Introduction
Exposure to abnormal heat can cause various adverse effects on human health,
from thermal discomfort to lethal outcomes (Gasparrini et al. 2015). Heat stress
also negatively affects economic activity by reducing labor productivity (Kjellstrom
et al. 2009; Burke, Hsiang, et al. 2015) as well as cognitive performance (Piil et al.
2020), but is also correlated with societal problems such as intimate partner violence
(Sanz-Barbero et al. 2018), suicide (Burke, González, et al. 2018) and broader
social conflicts (Hsiang et al. 2013). Impacts on human health occur through
extreme events such as heat waves or droughts, but also through gradual changes
in average temperatures. Recent scientific advances have attributed heat impacts
on health to anthropogenic climate change (Knutson and Ploshay 2016; Harrington
and Otto 2018) and there is ample evidence that these impacts will become even
more prominent under more amplified global warming (Mora et al. 2017; Sherwood
2020). Heat stress becomes amplified in urban areas due to the urban heat island
effect (Zhao, Lee, et al. 2014), making populations in cities additionally vulnerable.
With urbanization projected to spread in all scenarios of socioeconomic development
(Jiang and O’Neill 2017), this effect is expected to become even more pronounced.
A way to alleviate the impacts of heat stress is to adjust indoor temperatures
with the use of a cooling device, such as a fan or an air conditioning (AC) device.
However, owning a cooling device is not only dependent on exposure to climatic
conditions, but also on socioeconomic factors, such as having enough income to
be able to afford a cooling device. Therefore, the impact of heat stress hinges on
the ability to adapt to it, and in this study we explore how the ability to adapt
varies in different scenarios of future developments of societies and of climate. We
are able to show how current and future inequalities in socioeconomic conditions
which create differential vulnerability to climate change. Combined with exposure
to climate hazards, enhances the understanding and detection of hotspots of climate
impacts around the world (Byers et al. 2018).
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Previous research focused mostly on modelling the effects of the uptake of cooling
strategies on energy demand and implications for climate change mitigation (Isaac
and van Vuuren 2009; De Cian et al. 2019; McNeil and Letschert 2008; van Ruijven,
De Cian, et al. 2019). Without questioning the importance of research on future
energy demand, here we take a different angle and focus instead on the adaptation
aspect of cooling, understanding the access to air conditioning as a reflection of
the ability of societies to adapt to the challenge of a broad conception of heat
stress measured by Cooling Degree Days (CDDs).
We take the ownership of air conditioning (AC) as a proxy for adaptation,
seeing it as one of the most effective implementable options on the household
level and taking advantage of the fact that its implementation can be traced
through census data and other country-level sources. We link the socioeconomic
adaptive capacity for cooling with climate-induced need for cooling to determine
the cooling gap, which expresses the difference between the population exposed
to heat stress and the population with the capacity to adapt to it through the
use of AC (Mastrucci et al. 2019).
Our study builds on previous research (Mastrucci et al. 2019; Isaac and van Vu-
uren 2009; McNeil and Letschert 2008), by providing a temporal perspective on
the cooling gap over the course of the 21st century, and by using a substantially
larger sample of countries and by testing for different threshold metrics of heat
discomfort. Using the scenario framework of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways
(SSPs) and the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), we create country-
level projections of adaptive capacity to deal with heat stress and of future population
exposed to heat stress.
Insights into the temporal and spatial evolution of adaptive capacity are impor-
tant for better understanding of future climate impacts, yet it is disproportionally less
represented in quantitative research compared to mitigation strategies and mitigation
challenges. In climate impacts research, better representation of adaptative capacity
and subsequently vulnerability would improve the framing of climate risk under
different socioeconomic conditions (Andrijevic, Crespo Cuaresma, et al. 2020a).
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Constraining the expectations of adaptation also reinforces the need for urgent
and stringent mitigation and challenges the notion that adaptation and mitigation
efforts can be substitutable (De Bruin, Dellink, and Tol 2009).
Within the broader spectrum of the Global Agenda for Sustainable Development,
lack of access to cooling is a dimension of energy poverty that has implications
for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Khosla et al. 2020), most directly
the SDG 7 on Energy Access, but through multiple economic, social and health
effects of heat stress, progress towards SDGs 1 (poverty), 2 (zero hunger), 3 (good
health and wellbeing), 5 (gender equality), 8 (decent work and economic growth),
10 (reduced inequalities), 11 (sustainable cities and communities) and 13 (climate
action) is also made more difficult (UN General Assembly 2015; Mastrucci et al.
2019). Providing a temporal perspective on how this dimension of energy poverty
evolves can inform the Agenda about what the socioeconomic conditions need to
evolve in parallel or need additional policies.
Analyzing adaptation through air conditioning, however, comes with a caveat.
The increased use of AC is contributing to the greenhouse gas emissions both through
rising demand for electricity and through their use of refrigerants – short-lived
climate pollutants such as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) (International Energy Agency
(IEA) 2018). This in turn creates a positive feedback with climate change and the
need for even more adaptation in the future. For this reason, AC is a contested
adaptation option and has been termed maladaptation (Barnett and O’Neill 2010).
These are important interlinkages to understand, for anticipating future energy
demand and for shedding light on how large the need for adaptation will be in the
future and for what must be considered in adaptation planning. However, ACs
are and will continue to improve in efficiency and their refrigerants will be better
controlled (International Energy Agency (IEA) 2018). Combined with low carbon
electricity systems which will be widespread by the 2050s in mitigation scenarios,
powering ACs may not be as consequential for emissions. Ultimately, example of
the cooling gap that arises from unequal access to AC can serve as a heuristic tool
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to showcase adaptation gaps as a result of socioeconomically vulnerable populations
exposed to increasing climate hazards.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 AC data
In this analysis we focus only on the AC ownership at the household level. However,
the stock of ACs in commercial and residential sectors is very similar and continue
to grow at a similar pace (International Energy Agency (IEA) 2018). Data for AC
ownership is gathered from several sources which together cover 67 countries or
about 80% of the global population, a substantially larger sample than in previous
research which used similar approaches. Most of the additional coverage comes
from the Global Data Lab (Global Data Lab 2020) which provides subnational
survey and census data on the ownership of electrical appliances, here aggregated
to the national level for a cross-country analysis. The full sample covered here
can be seen in Figure 4.1.
For a better overview, most of the results in the rest of this study will be
presented with the countries from our sample grouped in eight geographical regions.
An overview of countries in the AC sample in each region can be found in the
Table C.2 in Annex C.
Cooling Degree Days (CDDs)
To calculate mean annual CDDs, we use the population-weighted (wg) average
by grid cell (gi) within each country (i), of the annual sum of the positive difference











Where Tsp ε (18°C, 20°C, 22°C, 24°C ) and popg > 10/km2.
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Figure 4.1: Data on AC ownership from multiple sources, used for the base specification
of the statistical model.
We use gridded daily mean surface air temperature data from five CMIP5 global
circulation models downscaled and bias-corrected to 0.5° (approximately 50 km at
the equator) (Hempel et al. 2013). For climate scenarios we use the Representative
Concentration Pathways (RCPs): RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP6.0 with respective
global mean temperatures 1.7°C (1.6°C); 2°C (2.5°C) and 1.9°C (2.9°C) in 2050
(2100) (Schleussner and Mengel n.d.) higher compared to the pre-industrial level.
Mean annual cooling degree days were calculated using 21 years of data centered
at each decade (2010 to 2100) to capture the gradual change in rising temperatures
and smoothen out the effects of inter-annual variability. Population weighting was
done using gridded population projections for the five SSPs (Jones and O’Neill
2016) similarly at decadal timesteps and 0.5° resolution.
4.2.2 Model
To estimate the future cooling gap, we combine the projections of future AC
availability and future population exposed to heat stress. AC availability projections
build on the two-stage modeling approach used in the seminal papers (Sailor
and Pavlova 2003; Isaac and van Vuuren 2009; McNeil and Letschert 2008) that
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Figure 4.2: Conceptual representation of the modeling steps and explanations of key
terminology.
established the relationship between AC ownership, climatic conditions and AC
availability. This approach expresses AC availability as a quotient of AC ownership
(actual rates of AC ownership in a given population) and a climate parameter.
The climate parameter – climate maximum saturation – defines the theoretical
climatic requirements for cooling, based on the energy demand for cooling that
starts above a certain temperature threshold (for more detail on climate maximum
saturation, see the Supplementary Material). For example, if 50% of households
in a country own air conditioning, and the maximum saturation determined by
the climatic conditions is also 50%, then AC is 100% available. The extent of AC
availability thereby depends on the ability to own AC when needed. In previous
studies, it was expressed as a function of income, which the most straightforward
determinant of whether an AC device can be purchased or not. Here we add
urbanization – meant to capture the increased demand for AC in urban areas (De
Cian et al. 2019) – and income inequality – to reflect heterogeneity in access to
energy and household appliances (Daioglou et al. 2012) – as dimensions of the
socioeconomic profile that might influence the availability of AC. Key concepts
and the modeling steps are summarized in Figure 4.2.
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We test the conversion from AC ownership to AC availability, with four different
set point temperatures (18°C, 20°C, 22°C and 24°C) that define the climate
maximum saturation, and later select the regression model based on the minimum
residual between the four estimates and use these country-specific temperature
combinations because they improve the model accuracy and the projections.
To study the relationships between AC availability and the socioeconomic
covariates we used beta regression with a logit link function, suitable for instances
in which the dependent variable takes values in the interval between 0 and 1
(Cribari-Neto and Zeileis 2010). We find that in addition to using income (proxied
by GDP per capita), urbanization and inequality as socioeconomic covariates
enhance the explanatory power of the regression model. Regression results are
provided in Table C.1 in Annex C.
The statistical model for the observational period rests on the following equation:
AC Availabilityi,t = β0 + β1GDPi,t + β2Inequalityi,t + β3Urbanizationi,t + εi,t
Coefficient estimates obtained from the beta regression model are imposed
on projections of GDP (Crespo Cuaresma 2017), inequality (Rao et al. 2018)
and urbanization (Jiang and O’Neill 2017) which, based on the same equation,
calculate future values of AC availability in the scenario framework of Shared
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), a commonly used set of scenarios of future
socioeconomic development (O’Neill, Kriegler, et al. 2017) (detailed descriptions
of each scenario can be found in the Supplementary Material).
Population exposed to heat stress is calculated by coupling the estimates of
population weighted CDDs, with population projections to estimate future exposure
to heat stress. The set point temperature used to estimate population exposed
to heat stress is 24°C, which was the temperature at which the residual was the
smallest for most countries in the regression analyses used above (see Figure C.2.
in Annex C). Then, we calculate populations in areas with at least 50, 100, 200 and
400 CDDs, and define the exposed population as the median value. Uncertainties
75
4.2. Methods
of the different temperature thresholds and counts of CDDs can be seen in the
see Figure C.3. in Annex C, together with several representative countries falling
into a given temperature-count bracket.
Finally, to calculate the cooling gap, we calculate the difference between
population exposed to heat stress and the share of population with access to
AC (AC availability):
Cooling gap = Population exposed to heat stress × (1 − AC Availability)
Limiting the estimates to this upper bound of tested temperatures is a con-
servative approach, compared to the previous research which typically takes the
daily mean temperature as the temperature threshold for cooling 18°C (Isaac
and van Vuuren 2009; Davis and Gertler 2015), meaning the estimates of heat
exposure would be even higher if we considered areas where cooling is demanded
at lower CDD thresholds.
It should be noted, however, that many different metrics of heat stress can be
found in research. A large body of work has dealt with the impacts of extreme heat
stress (e.g. heat waves) (Andrews et al. 2018; Diffenbaugh et al. 2007; Dahl et al.
2019; Zhao, Lee, et al. 2014), which can have more adverse and more severe impacts
on human health than the heat stress metric that is underlying this analysis. This
means that the conception of heat stress here spans thermal discomfort that can
be alleviated with “mild” air conditioning and severe heat stress that requires, for
example, the AC to run overnight. For estimates of energy demand, it is important
to understand the intensity and the duration of the AC use, but our analysis focuses
on whether people have access to AC and thereby our definition of heat stress can be
more flexible. Accounting for other parameters that determine the severity of heat
stress, such as the deviation from the monthly mean, humidity, number of consecutive
days of heat stress or the diurnal period (i.e. difference between daily maximum and
daily minimum temperature which would allow for insights on the recovery period
from heat) would nevertheless be a valuable contribution in future applications.
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Figure 4.3: Observed and projected rates of AC availability for eight large geographical
regions.
4.3 Results and discussion
4.3.1 AC availability
Figure 4.3 shows the projections of future AC availability, with country-level
estimates averaged on the level of eight geographical regions, and with RCP 4.5 -
the central scenario used throughout the analysis. High AC availability reflects high
levels of income and urbanization and on average low levels of income inequality.
North America is the only region that displays 100% AC availability, followed
by Europe at about 60%. Both of these regions display little scenario difference
in their future AC availability, implying that adaptive capacity to use AC against
heat stress is high, and will remain high in the future in the scenarios that we
considered here. The other six regions differ substantially in the degree of scenario
dependence. The difference is the largest for South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa,
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which in scenarios of low and sluggish socioeconomic development (SSP3 and 4)
see a stagnation or a marginal increase to about 25% of AC availability by the
end of the century, in the middle-of-the-road scenario SSP2 reach about 60% and
40% respectively by 2100, and in scenarios of fast socioeconomic developments,
reach saturation rates between 75% and 100% over the same time period. East
Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North
Africa also display scenario differences, with about a 50-percentage point spread
between scenarios at the end of the century. AC availability in Central Asia is
expected to increase in all scenarios, with difference in 2100 between the “worst”
and “best” case scenario of 25 percentage points.
4.3.2 Heat stress exposure
Figure 4.4 shows estimates of heat stress used to calculate cooling gap. Already
today, the population in the Southern Hemisphere is disproportionally affected by
heat stress, with much of the Sahel region, Sub-Saharan Africa and most of South
Asia having over three quarters of their populations exposed to heat stress.
Going towards mid-century in mid-range scenarios for both population growth
and climate (SSP2 and RCP 4.5), increasing shares of population in the northern
hemisphere are affected, and in 2100, almost entire populations in all countries
except for Scandinavia and Great Britain are exposed to some sort of heat stress
and heat discomfort in these two scenarios. Uncertainties in the climate scenario
for 2050 and 2100 for RCPs 2.6 and 6.0 are available in the Figure C.5 in Annex C.
4.3.3 Cooling gap projections
Figure 4.5 shows the absolute population affected by cooling gap – i.e. people
exposed to heat stress, but without access to it. We focus on two time slices:
mid-century and end of century, for emissions scenario RCP 4.5 and SSPs 1-3
which span the entire range of estimates (for paucity we show only three scenarios).
In 2050, South Asia stands out as a region with the largest population affected
by cooling gap, with the scenario spread between 750 million people affected in
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Figure 4.4: Population exposed to heat stress measured by CDDs above the set point
temperature of 24°C in 2020, 2050 and 2100. Increase in population is based on SSP2
scenario and CDDs increase is in RCP 4.5.
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SSP1 and over 2 billion people affected in SSP3. The second most affected region
is Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by East Asia & Pacific. By the year 2100, the
number of people affected by cooling gap substantially reduces for scenario of
fast socioeconomic development (SSP 1) and reduces to a medium degree in the
scenario of largely continuing the current development trends (SSP 2). Meanwhile,
population affected drastically increases in SSP3 – a scenario of fast population
growth and slow socioeconomic development – reaching almost 3 billion in South
Asia and 2.5 billion in Sub-Saharan Africa.
When the cooling gap is regarded in relation to the total population of these
regions (Figure 4.6), the picture becomes different, with Sub-Saharan Africa now
having the highest shares of population affected by cooling gap across all but the
worst scenario and in both time periods. The region affected the least is North
America. As shown on Figure 4.4, North America already is and is projected
remain largely unconstrained in terms of its adaptive capacity to heat stress, and its
population is projected to stagnate or even shrink in most scenarios. In the worlds
of SSP3, almost 80% of people in South Asia and 70% Sub-Saharan Africa would
be exposed to heat stress without the adaptive capacity to deal with it, both in
mid-century and in the long run. The access to AC can be improved by mid-century
in scenarios of faster income growth, urbanization, reduced inequality and slower
population growth, but only at the end of the century these regions are projected to
display similar levels of cooling gap to today’s rich countries of Europe and North
America. Somewhat smaller, but still substantial portions of people are going to
be affected in these scenarios also in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in the
Middle East and North Africa regions. Significant improvements can be brought
about in the SSP1 pathways, but only towards the end of the century.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 also show the spread of estimates across the three RCP
scenarios. As noted earlier in the section on heat stress exposure, the metric used
here is generally not very sensitive to the climate scenario, but some regions still
display differences up to 10 percentage points. Because of the nature of the three
RCP scenarios used here which do not markedly differ until later in the century,
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Figure 4.5: Absolute population estimates affected by cooling gap in 2050 and 2100.
The central estimate for heat stress is based on RCP4.5, and the whiskers indicate the
spread of the emissions scenarios. The bars are grouped in eight geographical regions and
shown for three SSP scenarios. 81
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Figure 4.6: Share of population affected by cooling gap in 2050 and 2100. The central
estimate for heat stress is based on RCP4.5, and the whiskers indicate the spread of the
emissions scenarios. The bars are grouped in eight geographical regions and shown for
each of three SSP scenarios. 82
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the climate signals become significantly pronounced only later, which is the reason
for seeing more visible impacts of the different emissions scenario only on graphs
for 2100. However, for the most affected regions of Central Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa, the way we measure heat stress makes very little difference to the outcomes
in terms of population affected because these locations already face high exposure.
This independence from the climatological component should be interpreted with
caution, because it does not speak to the more severe impacts of heat extremes that
are projected to occur already at 2°C global mean temperature increase above the pre-
industrial period, though could be dampened if the warming is limited to the Paris
Agreement goal of 1.5°C (Schleussner, Lissner, et al. 2016). Nevertheless, the CDD
metric used for estimating heat exposure here reflects the need for AC in a broad
sense and while this need might become more pressing in the future, we are not able
to assess how pressing it will become depending on the level of warming, but merely
that it is there and that populations will seek for adjusting their thermal comfort.
Even though the most affected regions here are consistently in the Southern
Hemisphere, previous research finds that a growing number of households in Europe
is struggling to meet their needs for cooling (Thomson et al. 2019), and the
same might hold for North America despite its consistently high estimates of AC
availability. This finding will become more pertinent with higher rates of people
living in cities (Jones, Tebaldi, et al. 2018). Spatial resolution of our research does
not allow for analyses on that level, but it is important to keep in mind that even
in the regions portrayed here as best-off, there could still be portions of populations
affected by cooling gap or energy poverty in a broader sense.
This analysis could be further elaborated upon with several additional consider-
ations. Firstly, although we cover – to our best knowledge – the biggest sample of
country-level data on AC saturation, 67 countries are far from a full global coverage
which would yield even more precise estimates. Secondly, we consider only one type
of cooling option, whereas other devices such as fans are also used for cooling. Third,
the use of CDDs to measure heat stress exposure has its shortcomings. CDDs do
not allow for a distinction between thermal comfort demands by people who want
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AC without severe risks of heat stress and people who need AC to survive. Also,
CDDs increase linearly with population, which ignores the variation household sizes
around the world (Biardeau et al. 2020). This metric also does not account for
differences in building standards and types, as better quality of insulation reduces
need for indoor cooling (De Cian et al. 2019). Lastly, physiological adaptation of
the body to heat stress is evident in people in hotter climates being less sensitive
to high temperatures (Zhao, Ducharne, et al. 2015), and this can be expected
to take place to some extent in the future as well. Future research could tackle
these shortcomings by using different heat stress metrics, or consider heat extremes
and their duration which would also have disproportionately negative effects on
the poor (Ahmadalipour et al. 2019).
4.4 Conclusion
The perspective of adaptive capacity as a function of different socioeconomic factors
is an important consideration for future projections of impacts of climate change,
which currently do not explicitly account for whether there is a potential for
adaptation in the first place. This study presents a toolkit for analyzing adaptive
capacity across countries and over time regarding AC use as an adaptation option
for coping with heat stress. Our analysis improves over earlier research that uses
only income as a predictor of AC availability by regressing AC availability on
income, urbanization and income inequality.
Based on the future trajectories of income, income inequality and urbanization,
we here show future estimates of AC availability, to reflect the adaptive capacity
to deal with heat stress. By coupling these projections with estimates of future
heat stress based on exposure to CDDs, we produce estimates of the future cooling
gap. Our projections show little dependence on the climate scenario or heat stress
threshold temperatures considered here, and the size of the gap between population
that needs AC for adjust their thermal comfort and the population able to afford AC
predominantly depends on the scenario of socioeconomic development (including
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population growth) which is reflected in the large range between the scenario
estimates. Between the scenario of low challenges to adaptation and mitigation
(SSP1) and the scenario with high challenges to adaptation and mitigation (SSP3)
total population affected by the cooling gap globally could vary between 2 to 5.2
billion people in 2050, and between 0.2 and 7.2 billion in 2100 (see Figure C.4
in Annex C). Future adaptive capacity in countries in the Global South depends
greatly on the socioeconomic dynamics or factors such as income, urbanization
and inequality, while the developed countries of the sample in this instance only
show dependence on the climatic conditions.
These estimates of the future cooling gap point at vast regional inequality in
future adaptive capacity, in all but most progressive scenarios of socioeconomic
development. Even in the most optimistic scenarios of the SSP framework, some
of the vulnerable regions will not reach the same levels as in rich countries. As an
important dimension of energy poverty, the extent of cooling gap and its scenarios
presented here can be used for informing the attainability of sustainable development
pathways of the different SDGs that depends on the broader socioeconomic dynamics.
The need to adapt to climate change is already apparent and will only become
more pressing in the future. Our analysis shows that fast population growth that is
not followed by socioeconomic development would expose more than three quarters
of populations to unabated heat stress in some of the world’s most populous regions,
like South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. The degree to which
societies will be able to adapt in the future needs to be elucidated, in order to
understand climate impacts better. This will help us avoid overestimating of the
potential of adaptation and underestimating of the urgency of mitigation.
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Abstract
Irrigation expansion onto rainfed croplands is an important part of the portfolio
of agricultural measures, contributing to a more resilient crop production while
enhancing agricultural yields. Existing global assessments of irrigation illustrate
the biophysical potential, but generally do not account for socioeconomic and
environmental constraints to irrigation deployment. Here we provide scenarios of
regionalized sustainable irrigation expansion linked to socioeconomic projections
from the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways framework, while accounting for bio-
physical irrigation limits. Under a Sustainability scenario, we find that sustainable
irrigation could feed 2 billion people globally by 2100. With an additional 90
million people, sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the highest percentage increase
in people fed via sustainable irrigation deployment. However, even under the
most optimistic scenarios only half of the theoretically possible global biophysical
irrigation potential would be utilized after accounting for socioeconomic constraints.
Our results highlight the need for appropriate representation of socioeconomic




More than 800 million people are currently chronically undernourished (United
Nations 2018). To meet the global increase in food demand, which is mainly driven
by population and income growth, projections suggest that current global crop
production needs to at least double by 2050 (Beltran-Peña et al. 2020). Most
agriculture is currently rain-fed, but climate change is expected to change rainfall
patterns and further exacerbate existing water- and heat-stress. Irrigation expansion,
despite its documented caveats (Foster et al. 2018; Pulido-Bosch et al. 2018), plays an
essential part in the portfolio of response options by offering the possibility to increase
crop yields via the maintenance of reliable water supply, while potentially also
alleviating biogeophysical effects on temperature extremes (Rosa, Chiarelli, Rulli, et
al. 2020). Irrigation will also have an important role in the sustainable intensification
of agriculture, an effort to halt agricultural expansion by increasing crop yields over
underperforming cultivated lands (Mueller et al. 2012). However, half of global
irrigation practices are unsustainable because they are depleting freshwater stocks
and impairing environmental flows (Rosa, Chiarelli, Tu, et al. 2019) (Box 1). Recent
global studies assessed biophysical constraints to sustainable irrigation and found
that global rain-fed croplands hold significant potential for sustainable irrigation
expansion because water will likely be available to suffice irrigation water demand
without depleting environmental flows and freshwater stocks (Rosa, Rulli, et al.
2018; Beltran-Peña et al. 2020). These studies find that around 2.4 billion people are
currently being fed via irrigation – half of it unsustainably (Rosa, Rulli, et al. 2018).
If the biophysical potential for sustainable irrigation was to be exhausted, a total
of 4 billion people could be fed via the calories that could potentially be produced
(Rosa, Rulli, et al. 2018). The analyses focused on hydrological limits to irrigation
expansion onto rain-fed croplands, without accounting for other socioeconomic
factors that might also influence irrigation expansion potentials. Yet, in over 25% of
global rain-fed croplands, irrigation is limited by institutional and economic capacity
instead of hydrologic constraints, a condition known as agricultural economic water
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scarcity (Rosa, Chiarelli, Rulli, et al. 2020). In fact, social, political, and economic
factors will ultimately influence future irrigation development. Therefore, there is a
pressing need to couple biophysical assessments of irrigation expansion potential
with socioeconomic projections to identify future target regions for sustainable
intensification of agriculture through irrigation expansion.
In this study we assess the irrigation crop yield gap – the difference between
the actual crop yield and the maximum potential yield that could be achieved by
deploying sustainable irrigation (Mueller et al. 2012). To study how the current
deployment of sustainable irrigation varies across countries and over time, we
introduce the Sustainable Irrigation Deployment Index (SIDI), which indicates how
much of its domestic sustainable irrigation potential a country is currently using in
comparison to what could be possible under maximum sustainable irrigation. We
assume that the extent to which the yield gap can be closed by deploying sustainable
irrigation depends on the societal ability to do so (we refer to this property as
adaptive capacity), which in turn is a product of various socioeconomic resources such
as governance (Klein et al. 2014). By determining which socioeconomic factors enable
or hinder the implementation of sustainable irrigation in the agricultural sector, we
are able to holistically project sustainable irrigation deployment alongside the Shared
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (O’Neill, Kriegler, et al. 2017) throughout the 21st
century (Box 1). It is important to understand the factors that enable or hinder
the deployment of sustainable irrigation, as well as the temporal dimension of those
factors. Thus far, these socioeconomic factors remain overlooked in assessments
of potential future irrigation deployment, including climate impact models, which
tend to assume optimal or maximum possible irrigation and thereby overstate
its benefits (Holman et al. 2019).
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5.2 The Sustainable Irrigation Deployment In-
dex
The SIDI is defined as the ratio between the current sustainably irrigated calorie
production and the maximum potential yield that could be attained at yield gap
closure (YGC) by deploying sustainable irrigation (see Figure 5.1 and Methods
section for more detail). Typically, maximum potential yield is defined as the yield
of a crop cultivar when it is grown in an environment with non-limiting water and
nutrient supplies, sufficient light and no pests or diseases (Evans and Fischer 1999).
While progress in technology has allowed for large quantities of nitrogen fertilizers
to be produced, water still remains a critical input limiting food production (Rosa,
Chiarelli, Rulli, et al. 2020). Therefore, we here consider the yield gap attributable
to a crop water deficit but for the sake of simplicity, we use yield gap closure
(YGC) to refer to a scenario where no water limitation is prevalent. The yield
gap is considered closed when there is no difference between potential sustainable
irrigation and the actual sustainable irrigation of countries (Rosa, Rulli, et al. 2018).
We build on previous estimates of the sustainable irrigation potential under current
conditions and a scenario of YGC (Rosa, Rulli, et al. 2018). The SIDI by design
informs on the potential for sustainable irrigation deployment, which should not be
interpreted as a measure of the share of sustainable versus unsustainable irrigation
in a country at a given point in time (see Figure D.2 in Annex D).
5.3 The SIDI in a socioeconomic context
Quantitative assessments of irrigation deployment have been of high interest in the
scientific community (Nachtergaele et al. 2020; Puy et al. 2020; Rost et al. 2009;
Jägermeyr et al. 2017; Faurès et al. 2002). Existing efforts to assess the future
implementation of sustainable irrigation were mainly focused on biophysical factors
by quantifying irrigation water requirements using climate, water or irrigation
models, or on the influence of future technological advancements according to
various scenarios (Döll and Siebert 2002; Hurtt et al. 2020; Graham et al. 2018;
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Figure 5.1: A conceptual framework of the Sustainable Irrigation Deployment Index.
The formula of the index is displayed on the bottom left. We provide example input data
from Rosa et al. (2018) for Russia and the United States of America because of their
importance in global food production, to illustrate the components of the SIDI. The map
shows the SIDI per country calculated with observed data from (circa) 2000.
Beltran-Peña et al. 2020; Rosa, Rulli, et al. 2018). However, they do not account
for country-specific socioeconomic conditions that, as key determinants of adaptive
capacity, will enable or preclude irrigation deployment (Klein et al. 2014). Moreover,
some of the existing studies do not take into consideration the biophysical constraints
for irrigation (e.g., (Hurtt et al. 2020)). Our study differs from existing analyses, as
the focus is on assessing how socioeconomic variables (embedded within the SSP
framework) will constrain or limit the biophysically sustainable irrigation potential.
In order to comprehend and isolate these socioeconomic drivers to irrigation
expansion, and to reduce further uncertainty related to projected climate impacts, we
refrain from additionally including the effects of climate change on water availability
and demand for irrigation in this study (Rosa, Chiarelli, Rulli, et al. 2020).
We embed the SIDI in the framework of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways, five
broad narrative-based scenarios of future socioeconomic developments (Figure 5.2).
These scenarios have been developed as baseline trajectories for use in integrated
assessments of climate change and socieconomic developments. The five SSPs span
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Figure 5.2: The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and concepts and definitions about
agriculture and irrigation. (a) Narratives of distinct socioeconomic futures over the
21st century. The framework provides quantitative adaptation-relevant projections for
population, education, urbanization, income, the Human Development Index, inequality,
governance and gender inequality. (b) Concepts and definitions of irrigated agriculture,
unsustainable irrigation8, rain-fed agriculture, sustainable irrigation expansion, crop yield
gaps, agricultural intensification, environmental flows and adaptive capaicty.
a wide range of futures in terms of the socioeconomic challenges they imply for
mitigation and adaptation (O’Neill, Kriegler, et al. 2017). The SSPs serve as a
basis for quantification of some of the key dimensions of the scenarios. Here we
utilize this framework to calculate projections of potential sustainable irrigation
expansion under socioeconomic change.
We test for different quantified socioeconomic dimensions of the SSPs to identify
those that explain variations across countries in the current level of sustainable
irrigation deployment, as proxied by the SIDI (see Tab. S2). Using a cross-
sectional regression with SIDI as the dependent variable, socioeconomic determinants
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as independent variables, and controlling for the share of rain-fed crops in the
total production, we find that governance (Kaufmann 2010) shows a significant
relationship with the SIDI (see Methods). The share in current rain-fed agriculture
(compared to the total sustainable calorie production) is expectedly relevant for
the level of sustainable irrigation deployment, indicating that countries in which
a high fraction of calorie production is currently met by rain-fed agriculture have
implemented sustainable irrigation to a lesser extent. From a hydrological point of
view, rainfed agriculture is also regarded as being sustainable, however, we assume it
to be less resilient in the light of climate change. The significance of governance, on
the other hand, indicates that countries with better institutions, less corruption and
better regulatory quality (to name a few characteristics of what constitutes “good
governance” according to the employed indicator (Andrijevic, Crespo Cuaresma,
et al. 2020a) are also closer to their maximum sustainable crop yields. These
relationships neither imply causation, nor does it imply that good governance is the
only driver of sustainable irrigation deployment. Our aim is to identify a statistical
relationship that allows for an internally-consistent temporal extension of the SIDI
within the SSP framework. GDP was also detected to have an effect on the current
variation of the SIDI, but it becomes insignificant after the indicator of governance
is introduced. The two identified predictors, namely the level of governance and
the share of rainfed agriculture, are able to explain more than 70% in the current
variations in used sustainable irrigation potential across the globe (Tab. S2).
5.4 Methods
The Sustainable Irrigation Deployment Index (SIDI) builds on previous work by
Rosa et al. (2018). We use the data estimates of calorie production under current
conditions and in the case of maximized crop production by alleviation of water
limitations (called the yield gap closure, or YGC scenario). Using a global process-
based crop water model (Chiarelli et al. 2020), Rosa et al. (2018) assessed crop
water requirements to reach yield gap closure, i.e. the amount of irrigation water
needed to complement input from precipitation so as to ensure sufficiently high soil
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moisture levels and satisfy the crop evapotranspirative demand. They used spatially
distributed information on rain-fed/irrigated yields and harvested areas in year
2000 from Monfreda et al. (2008) and Portmann et al (2010), respectively. They
first calculated evapotranspiration for each day, crop and grid cell for both rainfed
and irrigated cases. The daily irrigation water requirements to reach YGC were
then calculated as the difference between the two, and aggregated over a year. They
compared the irrigation water demand to local renewable freshwater availability (for
both human water use and environmental flows) to identify regions of the world where
irrigation can be expanded into currently rain-fed croplands without threatening
freshwater ecosystems and depleting freshwater stocks. The analysis was conducted
at the pixel level, we aggregated their results to the country- and region-level.
5.4.1 The Sustainable Irrigation Deployment Index
We derive the calories that are currently produced via sustainable irrigation from
the estimates of Rosa et al. (2018) of total calories produced via irrigation as well as
their unsustainable share in 2000 (see Equation 1 and Tab. S1). We then use their
estimates of total irrigation calories produced via irrigation under a yield gap closure
scenario (Cirr), the additional calories that would be produced via unsustainable
expansion or intensification under YGC (Cirru) and the calories currently produced
via unsustainable irrigation (Cirru) to assess the potential gain under YGC by
implementing sustainable irrigation (Equation 2). The amount of calories produced
under YGC also includes those being currently produced. All estimates are reported
in 1015 kcal per year, the full table can be found in the Annex D (Table D.1).
Current sustainable irrigation = Cirr˘Cuirr
Sustainable irrigation under Y GC = Y GCirr˘Y GCuirr˘Cuirr
The SIDI is then derived following:
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Sustainable irrigation deployment index (SIDI) = Current sustainable irrigation
Sustainable irrigation under Y GC
5.4.2 Linear model of the present-day SIDI
After deriving the SIDI for each country under current conditions, we calculated
the mean GDP (Crespo Cuaresma 2017; Dellink et al. 2017; Leimbach et al.
2017), population (KC and Lutz 2017), urbanization (Jiang and O’Neill 2017),
and governance (Andrijevic, Crespo Cuaresma, et al. 2020a) over the 1995-2005
time period. Our approach aims to explain between-country variation in the SIDI
with a linear regression model using the above-mentioned socioeconomic variables
as predictors. Details on the coefficients and significance associated with each
variable are included in the supplementary materials (Tab. S2). Our final model
specification expresses SIDI as a function of the share of calories produced via
rain-fed agriculture (Share rainfed) and governance:
SIDIi,t = β0 + β1Share rainfedi,t + β2Governancei,t + εi,t
where i denotes country, t denotes time (year), β0 is the intercept, coefficients β1 and
β2 are the coefficient estimates for the covariates and εi,t is the robust standard error.
5.4.3 SIDI projections.
Keeping the β coefficients constant, we derive projections for the SIDI by using
estimates of the future evolution of the governance index for each of the five SSP
scenarios (see Table D.2 in Annex D), as well as computing that of the future share
of rain-fed agriculture for every 5 years. Future governance estimates are available
until 2095, therefore our projections also end in this year.
Governance projections were unavailable for some countries, which were thus
removed from the analysis: Angola, Afghanistan, Albania, Myanmar, Montenegro,
State of Palestine, Timor-Leste and China Taiwan. Furthermore, a few countries for
which our linear model returns a negative SIDI in the year 2020 have been removed:
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Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Chad and Togo. In total, projections of
the SIDI and associated calories were calculated for 130 countries.
5.4.4 Share in rain-fed agriculture
The share of rainfed agriculture in the total calorie production was found to
have the highest explanatory power over variations in the SIDI across countries.
It is defined as:
Share rainfed = Crain(Cirr − Cuirr) + Crain
Where Crain denotes the current (2000) calories produced with rain-fed agriculture.
Crain and Cuirr are projected to stay constant in a YGC scenario, as we do not
account for the impacts of future climate changes (please see Figure D.3 in Annex D).
However, since Share_rainfed evolves along with the number of calories produced
via sustainable irrigation, we calculate it analytically for each time step (every
5 years, see SM for more information).
5.4.5 Calories
To assess the calorie production through sustainable irrigation over time, we multiply
SIDI estimates at a time t with the calories produced via sustainable irrigation
in a YGC-scenario, following Equation 6.
Calories(t) = SIDI(t) ∗ Y GCirr
Calculation of additional people fed in a given scenario and for a specific year requires
an estimation of caloric intake per person. Rosa et al (2018) calculated the daily
calorie requirements equivalent to a diet with 20% animal products by assessing the
caloric and protein contents of each crop. After accounting for conversion efficiency,
they arrived at an estimate of 3343 vegetal kcal required per capita and per day.
For each SSP, we calculate the sum of all calories produced in 2020, 2050 and 2100
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in all countries using Equation 7 to arrive at global values. To assess the additional
people fed, we subtract the number of people fed in 2020 from the corresponding
2050 and 2100 estimates. The average calories were then averaged over the World
Bank regions. Further, the percentage increase in sustainable calorie production
compared to 2020 and up until 2100 was calculated as:
Percentage increase = 100 ∗ caloriesprojected(t) − calories2020
calories2020
The total amount of people fed at YGC globally (~4 billion) was quantified
from the dataset by Rosa et al (2018) by summing the maximum calories produced
(for the same countries as in this analysis), dividing the calories by 365 days (to
arrive at the per day estimate) and further dividing the result by 3343 vegetal
kcal to arrive at the total people that can be fed at YGC. The same method was
applied to quantifying the total amount of people fed via sustainable irrigation at
the end of the century for the different SSPs (~2 billion).
5.5 Projecting sustainable irrigation deployment
The coefficient estimates from the regression model are applied on the governance
projections (Andrijevic, Crespo Cuaresma, et al. 2020a) from the SSPs, which
allows for future projections of the SIDI over the 21st century for each of these five
scenarios, also taking into account the progression of the share in rain-fed agriculture
at every time step as irrigation is deployed (see Methods). In Figure 5.3a the global
and regional development of the SIDI is displayed, with projections starting in 2020
and ending in 2100. The red dots in Figure 5.3a display the SIDI that was quantified
using data (Rosa, Rulli, et al. 2018) from 2000 and serve as reference points. Figure
5.3b shows the regional differences for a Middle of the Road scenario (SSP2).
The projections of the SIDI alongside the five SSPs display large heterogeneities
between regions and scenarios. Globally and regionally Figure 5.3a, SSP5 and SSP1
are the most optimistic scenarios, which is consistent with the scenario storylines, as
governance reaches the highest levels in these two scenarios. SSP3, also in line with
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Figure 5.3: Projections of the Sustainable Irrigation Deployment Index. (a) Trajectories
are shown for global and regional and for the different SSP-scenarios. (b) Regional
projections of the SIDI for Middle of the Road scenario (SSP2). The data for 2000
(observed) is from Rosa et al. (2018) and the projections are shown from 2020 until 2100.
The regional projections are displayed for the World Bank regions31 (delineation of the
regions can be seen in Fig. 3).
the storylines, is the most pessimistic scenario, displaying the smallest improvements
for the index both globally and regionally. The global average SIDI for the year
2000 is estimated at 0.23 Figure 5.3a. This indicates that only 23% of the global
sustainable irrigation potential was being used at the beginning of the century. The
global SIDI is projected to improve from 0.23 to 0.43 in a Sustainability scenario
(SSP1) – which implies that globally 43% of the sustainable irrigation potential could
be utilized by the end of the century. In contrast, in a Regional Rivalry scenario
(SSP3), the SIDI would only improve to 0.34. In this scenario, we would only use
34% of the sustainable irrigation potential globally by the end of the century.
Regional results for the baseline SIDI vary largely (between 0.5 and 0.4) in year
2000 (Figure 5.3b). South Asia has the highest SIDI in 2000, followed by East Asia
& Pacific – both displaying results above 0.4. This indicates that, compared to other
regions, these two are currently using a high fraction of their sustainable irrigation
potential (around 40%) and therefore the ability of their agricultural sector to
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buffer precipitation variations via irrigation endows them with a relatively high
adaptive capacity (Figure 5.3a). Countries in this region, such as India or Pakistan,
are known for their strong dependence on the agricultural sector and have already
implemented large-scale irrigation systems in the past (Anik et al. 2017), although
this has led some of them to currently rely on unsustainable exploitation of water
resources (Rosa, Rulli, et al. 2018). South Asia is the region closest to narrowing
the yield gap by the end of the century, reaching an index of 0.70 in a Sustainability
scenario (SSP1). In SSP3, South Asia will reach a SIDI of 0.58 in 2100.
In contrast, the region with the smallest SIDI in year 2000 is Sub-Saharan
Africa (0.05), which indicates that the region is currently using very little of its
sustainable irrigation potential. This is because most countries in the region do
not yet have the possibility to access water management technologies and benefit
from irrigation (i.e., face economic water scarcity), even though irrigation has long
been emphasized as a solution to intensify agricultural production, support rural
economic development and enhance resilience to climate variability and change
(Lefore et al. 2019; Higginbottom et al. 2021). This also relates to the low levels of
governance (e.g. ineffective national bureaucracies), which has hindered large-scale
irrigation projects in Sub-Saharan Africa in the past (Higginbottom et al. 2021).
The projections of the SIDI emphasize the vast potential for improvement in the
region. In a Sustainability scenario, Sub-Saharan Africa could reach a SIDI of 0.38
by 2100, a > 600% improvement compared to 2000 levels. In contrast, in SSP3
the SIDI of the region would not go above 0.21. As can be seen in Figure 5.3b,
Sub-Saharan Africa will reach the same SIDI levels as Europe by the end of the
century in a Middle of the Road-scenario (SSP2).
The remaining regions (Central Asia, Europe, Latin America & Caribbean,
Middle East & North Africa and North America) reached indices comparable to
the global average (between 0.1 and 0.3) in year 2000. Regions such as Europe
and North America are, despite their level of development, not yet using a lot
of their sustainable irrigation potential and reach an index around 0.2. This is
because most countries within that region rely heavily on rain-fed agriculture for
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their caloric production but have a reduced dependency on irrigated agriculture
(under current climatic conditions). Moreover, Europe and North America already
feature high levels of governance in the baseline period, which diminishes their
sustainable irrigation expansion in our analysis.
5.6 People fed via sustainable irrigation
Future increase in sustainable irrigation as proxied by the SIDI and projected
alongside the SSPs can be translated into potential calorie production and people
fed. Figure 5.4a shows the total people fed via sustainable irrigation in 2020, 2050
and 2100 within a region. The number of people fed is displayed for a Sustainability
scenario (results for other SSPs can be deduced from Tab. S3). Figure 5.4b shows
the percentage increase from 2020 throughout the 21st century for the different
SSP scenarios. Governance estimates are only available until 2095, therefore our
projections also end in this year. However, we assume the same level of the SIDI
and calories produced in 2095 and 2100, to match the population estimates.
According to our model estimates, the region East Asia & Pacific is currently
able to produce the highest level of calories via sustainable irrigation in 2020 and
feeds a total of 597 million people. South Asia is the region with the second highest
calorie production, with a total of 329 million people being fed via sustainable
irrigation in the same year. The lowest calorie production and number of people
fed through sustainable irrigation is apparent for Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle
East & North Africa (36 million and 51 million, respectively) (Figure 5.4).
The analysis shows that the regions in which a lower amount of people are fed
via sustainable irrigation in 2020 are able to make the greatest improvements by
2100 in that regard. Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, will experience the highest
percentage increase in people fed via sustainable irrigation, by more than 250%
until 2100 (compared to 2020) in a Sustainability scenario. This would increase the
total amount of people being fed via sustainable irrigation from 36 million people
in 2020 to 127 million people by the end of the century (Figure 5.4).
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Figure 5.4: People fed via sustainable irrigation in 2020, 2050 and 2100. (a) Total
amount of people fed per region in 2020, 2050 and 2100 via sustainable irrigation for the
World Bank regions in SSP1 (people fed reported in million per year). (b) Percentage
change in people fed via sustainable irrigation (per country) is also shown for the World
Bank regions and the five SSP scenarios from 2020 until 2100. Results for the other SSPs
can be found in Annex D Table 3.
In contrast, East Asia & Pacific, the region with the highest amount of people
fed via sustainable irrigation in 2020, will improve by around 30% until 2100 in a
Sustainability scenario (SSP1). That percentage improvement would still increase
the amount of people fed from 597 million people in 2020 to 776 million people by
the end of the century in SSP1. This is the highest regional average in our analysis.
Differences between the socioeconomic scenarios are less pronounced in regions
with smaller relative improvement (e.g., a 3% difference between SSP1 and SSP3 in
North America as opposed to 140% difference in Sub-Saharan Africa) (Figure 5.4.
Globally, we find that in SSP1, sustainable irrigation could feed a total of 1.93
billion people by the end of the century (Table 5.1). When relating this to the
estimated population increase, we project that 28% of the global population could be
fed via sustainably irrigated calories produced. In contrast, only 1.54 billion people
could be fed via sustainable irrigation by the end of the century in a SSP3 scenario
– which could feed 12% of the global population. The analysis shows that SSP1 and
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% fed in 2100
SSP1 1.36 1.68 1.93 6.88 28%
SSP2 1.34 1.58 1.80 9.00 20%
SSP3 1.32 1.46 1.54 12.6 12%
SSP4 1.33 1.54 1.71 9.27 18%
SSP5 1.35 1.70 1.98 7.36 27%
Table 5.1: Total people fed globally with sustainable irrigation in 2020, 2050 and 2100,
population projections and the fraction of people fed via sustainable irrigation per SSPP.
Total people fed was quantified assuming a calorie intake of 3343 kcal per capita per day
(Rosa et al. 2018). Population projections are for each SSP in the year 2100 (KC and
Lutz 2017). People fed are displayed in billion per year.
SSP5 will have the best chances at meeting projected global food demands, whereas
SSP3 and SSP4 will face the highest challenges in reaching that objective (Table 5.1).
5.7 Fraction of yield gap closure level
In a yield gap closure scenario and using estimates from (Rosa, Rulli, et al. 2018),
a total of 4 billion people could potentially be fed via sustainable irrigation in the
absence of socioeconomic constraints (See Table D.1 in Appendix D). However, our
results show that socioeconomic factors are most probable to substantially constrain
this potential. Even by the end of the century, in the most optimistic scenario
(SSP1), only about half of the theoretically possible potential would be realized
(about 2 billion people). 1.4 billion people are fed with sustainable irrigation in 2000,
curtailing the future additional potential even further (compare Table 5.1). This
underlines a growing need to incorporate socioeconomic projections into analyses
of future food security (Beltran-Peña et al. 2020).
Figure 5.5a compares yield gap closure potential under SSP1 with irrigation
biophysical potentials. By 2100 under SSP1, South Asia will be able to use 70% of
the irrigation yield gap closure potential, followed by the Middle East & North Africa
(54%) and Latin America & Caribbean (49%). By contrast, panel B displays the
amount of people per region that could be fed via sustainable irrigation by the end
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Figure 5.5: Projected sustainable irrigation potential used in a Sustainability scenario
(SSP1) compared to a YGC scenario and people fed by the end of the century. (a)
Percentage difference between projected sustainable irrigation calories produced in 2100
for a Sustainability scenario (SSP1) and sustainable irrigation calories produced in a
YGC-scenario from Rosa et al. (2018). (b) Total amount of people fed per region (reported
in million per year) via sustainable irrigation in 2100 for SSP1.
of the century for SSP1. While East Asia & Pacific is the country with the highest
number of people fed (776 million), we find South Asia (432 million) and Central
Asia (146 million people) to be countries with high sustainably irrigated calorie
production and thus population fed, by the end of the century. Sub-Saharan Africa,
which was the region with the lowest people fed in 2020, is projected to feed more
people by the end of the century (127 million) than North America (67 million) and
Middle East & North Africa (66 million). This shows, for example, that in Europe
the number of people fed via sustainable irrigation is comparably high (146 million),
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while their yield gap remains substantial (33% from YGC). By the end of the century,
none of the regions will close the yield gap in neither of the scenarios. Nevertheless,
substantial increases in people fed via sustainable irrigation can be recorded.
5.8 Irrigation in the context of climate change
Consistently with the SSP framework that by design does not account for impacts
of future climate change, we also do not account for those in our projections
(O’Neill, Kriegler, et al. 2017). Both the SIDI and future estimates of sustainable
irrigation potential were thus derived using present-day crop water requirements
and surface water availability quantities. However, future calorie production and
the sustainable irrigation expansion potential will be impacted by climate change
through its alteration of precipitation amount and timing, the occurrence of extreme
events (Tabari 2020), as well as changing soil moisture and crop water requirements
(Rosa, Chiarelli, Rulli, et al. 2020). Changes in water availability and demand and
higher exposure to heat extremes are, for example, projected to negatively impact
local agricultural production and reduce potential benefits of CO2 fertilization in
the Mediterranean, Central America, the Caribbean, South Africa and Australia
(Schleussner, Lissner, et al. 2016; Byers et al. 2018).
5.9 Implications for climate adaptation
Irrigation is one of the most prominently discussed adaptation measures to climate
change (Rosa, Chiarelli, Rulli, et al. 2020), however its negative consequences,
including environmental flows impairment and depletion of freshwater stocks, are
not always acknowledged. Understanding the potential for sustainable expansion of
irrigation is essential, as climate change adaptation will likely drive a substantial
expansion of this technology. In addition, the multiple facets of socioeconomic
development that determine a countries’ capacity to tap into existing sustainable
irrigation potentials remains largely ignored in this context. Our scenarios do not
explicitly represent the impacts of climate change that would provide a perspective
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on the need for irrigation expansion as an adaptation measure. But they illustrate
what socioeconomic constraints may exist to its successful implementation, as
for many world regions irrigation expansion would already be a highly effective
adaptation measure under current climate conditions. They highlight that even
existing and well-established technologies such as irrigation may be limited in their
availability to alleviate impacts at higher levels of warming. It is important to
highlight that our scenarios do not provide an upper limit of what could be possible
in terms of irrigation deployment as a climate adaptation measure, but that other
factors, which we were not able to include in our analysis, could further enable the
implementation of sustainable irrigation. Overcoming socioeconomic constraints to
improve adaptation deployment under climate change is a distinct possibility, and
in some cases might be a necessity to prevent substantial reductions in agricultural
productivity (Rosa, Chiarelli, Rulli, et al. 2020). Our findings highlight that this
might be all but easy given the observed evidence of socioeconomic factors limiting
the effectiveness of irrigation deployment (Higginbottom et al. 2021).
5.10 Discussion
By introducing the Sustainable Irrigation Deployment Index we assess how so-
cioeconomic conditions are related to the current level of sustainable irrigation
with respect to its potential under a yield gap closure scenario. In our analysis, a
governance indicator – defined as the institutional capacity of countries – emerges as
a socioeconomic factor that best explains the current level of sustainable irrigation
deployment. Our findings on the importance of governance and institutions as
key conditions for the successful deployment of such adaptation options are in line
with other findings on indices reflecting adaptive capacity (Higginbottom et al.
2021). The two identified predictors, namely the level of governance and the share
of rainfed agriculture, are able to explain more than 70% in the current variations
in used sustainable irrigation potential across the globe. By comprehending which
factors currently hinder or enable sustainable irrigation, we are able to project
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the evolution of sustainable irrigation deployment throughout the 21st century
alongside the socioeconomic development of countries.
Socioeconomic constraints that currently limit sustainable irrigation expansion
are particularly prominent in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, where less than
1% of the sustainable irrigation potential is currently being used. Due to the
currently low levels of socioeconomic development, it will and has been more
challenging to introduce new farming approaches, such as retaining rainwater for
irrigation. This is in line with findings from Holman et al. (2019), who report
that the implementation of irrigation systems, despite large-scale investments in
its infrastructure, where hindered by centralized bureaucracies, lacking technical
expertise and political incentives (Higginbottom et al. 2021). However, in regions
where most of the population growth is expected to occur in the coming decades, it
will be crucial to reach much higher levels of adaptive capacity in the agricultural
sector, to counteract already existing hunger and malnutrition. For example, in the
Sahel region, where less than 4% of cropland is currently equipped with any kind of
irrigation infrastructure and where population growth is already outstripping food
supply, population is expected to more than double to 450 million by 2050 (Graves
et al. 2019). International and local efforts need to focus on increasing adaptive
capacity in these regions, as well as specific support for irrigation deployment in
the agricultural sector, to support the well-being of hundreds of millions of people.
The findings presented in this study can be useful for impact or crop models
that assess potential future crop yields. While sustainable freshwater constraints are
increasingly considered in such modelling efforts (Wang et al. 2021), socioeconomic
considerations limiting irrigation deployment are so far not consistently implemented.
Our projections also provide important entry-points to include information on the
future climate resilience and adaptive capacity for policy-making in Integrated
Assessment Models (IAMs). We report a substantial scenario dependence of
future sustainable irrigation expansion which underscores the need to incorporate
socioeconomic variables into projections of future agricultural developments. This
study provides a starting point for the analysis of other adaptation options, such
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as crop migration (Sloat et al. 2020), or for other sectors in which adaptation
will be determining for climate resilience (e.g., reservoirs planning for irrigation).
Assessing the future adaptive capacity of countries and including this information
in impact assessments will be of key importance to assess pathways to climate
resilience. The capacity of countries to ensure food security in the context of rapidly
changing biophysical conditions will be one of the major determinants for the next
century (Myers et al. 2017). In summary, our results show that by improving
the socioeconomic conditions (e.g., governance) of countries, we will move closer
to reaching the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) of zero hunger and other
highly relevant and interrelated SDGs, highlighting their interconnectedness and
the importance of a holistic sustainability agenda.
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The extent to which “weather turns into disasters” (Otto et al. 2020) is not only
contingent on the physical properties of climate change hazards but crucially
depends on socio-economic factors that contribute to exposure and vulnerability
to those hazards (Byers et al. 2018; Schleussner, Deryng, et al. 2018). Current
manifestations and future projections of climate change have been pointing to the
need for adaptation alongside the urgent and stringent mitigation, most notably
in areas of the world that are at the frontline of climate change.
With the need for it apparent in many parts of the world, adaptation science has
been rapidly advancing over the past two decades. The portfolio of options has been
growing, together with the understanding of the potential of adaptation to reduce
climate risks. However, scenarios that are used to answer the “what-if” questions
on strategies to deal with climate change are not yet advanced in analyzing various
adaptation-related challenges and their temporal trajectories. Modeling tools that
assess policy options and how they might affect climate change outcomes do not
yet incorporate quantified adaptive capacity indicators that would help compare
the interlinkages between socio-economics and climate hazards. Instead, climate
impacts tend to be estimated with stylized adaptation scenarios: no adaptation or
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optimal (or maximum) adaptation. For improved predictive capabilities of models,
a more nuanced representation of adaptation and its possible pathways is needed.
It is unclear, at least from a global modeling perspective, under which conditions
would adaptation be pursued optimally, and under which it would be inadequate.
In other words, quantitative assessments do not yet account for adaptive capacity
that depends on economic, financial, institutional and other barriers, which might
render the “optimal” adaptation unattainable. While many of the barriers can be
overcome as part of broader socio-economic dynamics, the pace at which this can
happen remains elusive. Understanding of the temporal evolution of barriers, or
whether and how they can be overcome, is crucial for anticipating the adaptive
capacity of a household, community or country to cope with climate change.
Expectations of adaptation that are not embedded within the broader socio-
economic context may lead to inaccurate climate change impacts, as well as their
human and monetary damages, not least because many areas where adaptation is
most pressing also face major development challenges. Understanding the temporal
trajectories, and the soft and hard limits of improvements in adaptive capacity
would add an additional layer to the identification of hotspots of high climate
risks where hazards, exposure and vulnerability overlap. Insights into adaptive
capacity are also relevant in the context of loss and damage, which will require
policy responses designed to support countries exposed to climate hazards with
limited capacity to adapt.
With the aim to provide high-level information that global assessments can
incorporate, the established conceptual connections and methodological advance-
ments presented in this thesis close an important gap in the current literature. The
thesis develops a flexible toolkit to account for adaptive capacity in scenarios of
future socio-economic development, with the aim to advance the representation
of adaptation in quantitative climate change research. The chapters presented
here connect the largest synthesis of climate science and a set of global scenarios
commonly used in climate change research to provide a comprehensive view on
economic, financial, educational and other socio-economic dimensions important
109
6.1. Synthesis
for adaptive capacity in the context of SSP scenarios. This integration enables an
assessment of the future pathways of adaptive capacity. Trajectories of adaptive
capacity are a major step towards understanding adaptation challenges, which
are at the core of the SSP scenarios. Adaptive capacity can be regarded both
in the context of possible policy options and exploring uncertainty surrounding
future climate impacts. The toolkit is intended for future application in climate
impact models and for assisting the efforts to incorporate climate impacts in the
scenario framework and more broadly in the Integrated Assessment Models as the
key tools used in the science-policy interface.
6.1.1 Extensions of the SSP scenarios
Extensions of the SSP scenario set with indicators of governance and gender
inequality shown in Chapters 2 and 3 help cover all categories of adaptation barriers
identified in the AR5. As some of the most pertinent adaptation barriers, timelines of
attaining better governance and overcoming gender inequality are key considerations
in understanding the temporal evolution of adaptive capacity.
Governance is, together with financial capacity and access to information, an
adaptation barrier present across all regions and all but two sectors. Though it was
featured qualitatively in the SSPs, Chapter 2 presents the first quantification of
governance to date. Strengthening governance (or its dimensions such as control of
corruption, political stability and quality of institutions) will be crucial for increased
adaptive capacity. Processes necessary for the implementation of adaptation include
prioritizing policies, mobilizing resources, coordination of efforts and decision-
making, all of which hinge on the governance level. Additionally, poor governance can
make other capacities (e.g. finance) less effective, thereby making governance-related
improvements a crucial complementary effort in enhancing other dimensions of
adaptive capacity. This chapter shows vast between-country inequality in the present-
day state of governance and scenario-dependent trajectories of future development.
For many currently developed countries, on the one hand, there is only a minor
scenario difference because they already exhibit high levels of governance, and
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scenarios do not incorporate any deterioration. On the other hand, for developing
countries, the difference in the level of governance between the best and worst-case
scenarios can be up to threefold. Finally, the results suggest that countries that
have suffered from conflicts and political instability over the observational period of
the last three decades could - even in scenarios of fast socio-economic progress - take
another three decades or longer to reach governance levels that countries from the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) exhibit today.
Gender inequality – the focus of Chapter 3 – as a socio-cultural barrier is also
one of the most pertinent barriers present in all but two sectors and one region.
Gender inequality affects primarily women, through various channels including
unequal access to various types of adaptation-relevant resources that put them at a
disadvantage. However, gender inequality as a component of adaptive capacity is
relevant for all actors involved in adaptation. In simplest terms, if women as half of a
given population are disadvantaged in the capacity to adapt to climate change, this
spills over to the population as a whole. Gender inequality is featured qualitatively
in the SSP storylines and is also quantitatively present by indicating the gender
gap in mean years of schooling (KC and Lutz 2017). Chapter 3 expands this
quantification with a more comprehensive indicator which also captures inequalities
in health and participation in political and economic life. The latest observed
values of the Gender Inequality Index (GII) used throughout this chapter depict
a stark North-South divide. However, in progressive socio-economic development
scenarios, almost a total global convergence can occur by mid-century. Compared to
indicators of governance, gender inequality (measured by the GII indicator) could
be improved upon faster across the world. In the paper, we argue that improving
upon the GII indicator, however, does not automatically mean that gender equality
is universally achieved, but rather that improvements in “basic” inequalities (such
as health care, education and employment) are possible already in the near term
with sufficient investments and international cooperation.
The usefulness of indicators of governance, gender inequality and other SSP
components is not limited to climate change research. Governance and gender
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equality are cornerstones of two Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), number
16 and 5 (UN General Assembly 2015). The analyses shown in Chapters 2 and
3 can be useful for exploring the SDGs to the extent that they show the possible
trajectories of development and global inequalities in the pace of improvement in
different scenarios. These trajectories can help identify the socio-economic processes
that happen in parallel with progress in the given indicator (e.g., GDP per capita
growth, expansion of tertiary education, reduction of the gender gap in education).
6.1.2 Sectoral applications of adaptive capacity assessments
The two sectoral applications in Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate the use of the SSP
framework to assess adaptive capacity. Both chapters use an econometric approach
to identify dimensions of adaptive capacity related to the use of air conditioning
as an adaptation option against heat (Ch. 4) and deployment of irrigation as an
adaptation strategy in the agricultural sector (Ch. 5).
In the human health sector of climate impacts, Chapter 4 advances the current
methodological approach to modeling air conditioning ownership by expressing it as
a function of income, urbanization and income inequality. SSP projections of those
three dimensions of adaptive capacity allow for deriving future AC ownership rates
in different socio-economic development scenarios. By coupling future AC rates
with future population projections, we estimate the cooling gap, which expresses the
difference between the population exposed to heat stress – as one of the universal
manifestations of climate change – and the population with access to air conditioning.
Our estimates show that, particularly for areas of fast population growth, large
shares of the population already are and will continue to be exposed to heat stress,
with the cooling gap varying between 2 billion people globally in SSP1 to 5.2 billion
in SSP5. Scenario-dependent adaptation potential (illustrated by AC ownership)
is now available for use in estimates of overall climate impacts of heat stress by
accounting for the extent to which heat stress can be reduced with adaptation.
Chapter 5 focuses on irrigation as an adaptation option in the agriculture
sector. The Chapter’s centerpiece is the so-called Sustainable Irrigation Deployment
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Index (SIDI), used to express the gap between the maximum potential crop yield
and the actual crop yield on the country level. The extent to which this gap
can be closed with irrigation depends on the socio-economic ability to deploy
sustainable irrigation. The analysis of this Chapter finds that sustainable irrigation
is related to the countries’ levels of governance (measured by the governance
indicator introduced in Chapter 2). The relationship between SIDI and governance
allows for projections of the future yield gap, which vary widely between regions
and scenarios. The governance barrier for irrigation is particularly relevant for
Sub-Saharan Africa, where governance might take decades to improve, while almost
no sustainable irrigation is currently taking place and only slow improvements
are projected without additional efforts to improve institutional conditions. Low
levels of governance are can render financial resources for irrigation ineffective,
which stresses the need for holistic assessments of adaptation barriers. Projections
presented in this Chapter are the first step to including information on the future
adaptive capacity in the agriculture sector, such as in crop models that assess
potential future crop yields, where socio-economic considerations of irrigation
deployment have not been implemented.
6.2 Limitations
6.2.1 Conceptual limitations of adaptive capacity
Some of the recent research distinguishes between the adaptive capacity anchored
in Sen’s capability approach (Sen 1999) (the conceptualization of adaptive capacity
used in this thesis) and the approach that captures not only the latent capacity but
also the mobilizing mechanisms which turn the capacity to adapt into an actual
adaptation implementation (Pelling and High 2005). This distinction is motivated
by instances in which areas with high adaptive capacity (based on the dimensions
such as financial and human capital) do not necessarily reflect high adaptation
implementation (Morteux and Barnett 2017; Gawith et al. 2020) and vice versa.
However, such outliers do not invalidate this approach on the global scale presented
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here, where the between-country dynamics robustly hold. However, only in hindsight
and with longer time series and more harmonized methods to track adaptation
it will be possible to better ascertain whether adaptation is taking place or not.
Understanding the mechanisms that help translate adaptive capacity into adaptation
implementation and identification of the hindrances is an important task for future
research and will be useful for context-specific actions and local policy-making.
6.2.2 Contested adaptation options
Chapters 4 and 5 use air conditioning and irrigation, which are controversial
adaptation options, primarily because of their emissions footprint, in the case of air
conditioning, or impact on water availability, in the case of irrigation. They are,
however, relatively straightforward to measure and quantify, which makes them a
useful starting point to showcase applications of the adaptive capacity toolkit. Our
results highlight that existing and well-established technologies (even if contested)
may be limited in their availability to tamper the impacts of climate change,
particularly at higher levels of warming. Future research should advance the analysis
with alternative and additional adaptation options in these two sectors, as well as
consider strategies that ensure that adaptation does not become maladaptation
(Barnett and O’Neill 2010).
Additionally, adaptation options can involve more complicated interactions
between different actors and sectors (Patt et al. 2010). Some adaptation options
might not be quantifiable (e.g. cultural traditions), and rather be explored through
qualitative scientific methods or mixed methods approaches. Limitations to quantifi-
cation need to be recognized and not necessarily forced into a modeling environment.
6.2.3 Limitations of the global approach
All analyses throughout this thesis are done using country-level data and relied on
exploiting the between-country variation on the global level. The internal dynamics
that shape the SSP’s trajectories are also global, a setup that is appropriate for
the types of models that operate on large geographical scales. However, global
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representation has limitations for the exact implications relevant for specific local
contexts. These limitations could be overcome with downscaling efforts and regional
extensions of models which can capture both the climatic and the socio-economic
conditions on a more refined resolution (Wouterse et al. in review; Chepkoech
et al. 2020; Stöber et al. 2017). Combining the advantages of a global analytical
model dynamics with qualitative context-specific assessment of future trajectories
of socio-economic components can improve the local applicability of projections.
The adaptive capacity toolkit presented here could be used with sub-national data
and scenario storylines adjusted to represent the local conditions better (Smits et al.
2021). Additionally, the bottom-up approaches that will assess scenarios of adaptive
capacity on the household level can be another promising avenue of research that
will help policy-makers identify areas of priority in the local context.
6.2.4 Limitations of the SSP scenarios
Scenarios are sometimes misconstrued as predictions of the future. Rather than
predicting, they are meant to help researchers and policy-makers explore the
uncertainty space and provide a consistent research platform for “what-if” types
of exercises. Of course, they are neither definite nor do they span the entire set
of possibilities of what might happen in the future.
The SSP scenarios that this thesis builds on suffer from their shortcomings
that could be addressed in the future but need to be kept in mind when using
and interpreting the adaptive capacity indicators develop here. Firstly, they do
not account for shocks such as economic crises or the pandemic, which could set
back improvements in socio-economic conditions made in the past. The absence
of such disruptions makes the scenarios inherently optimistic, where even the
worst-case scenario looks more like stagnation than deterioration. As shown in
Chapter 3 on governance projections, the scenario optimism cannot incorporate
observed dynamics such as the rapid decline in the governance indicator in Syria
in the aftermath of the war. The dynamics behind these deteriorations are not
straightforward to incorporate in deterministic modeling approaches underlying the
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SSPs, representing a limitation of scenario frameworks in general. However, recent
advances in forecasts of the probability of internal armed conflicts (Hegre, Buhaug,
et al. 2016; Hegre, Nygård, et al. 2021) provide a way to consider projections
of conflicts in future scenarios.
Secondly, in their current format, SSP scenarios represent long-term trajectories,
i.e., until the end of the 21st century. The long time horizon is appropriate for
considerations of slow-onset consequences of climate change and understanding
the extent to which mitigation choices affect the climatic factors. As such, SSP
scenarios are not necessarily useful for very near-term analyses of adaptation or
socio-economic developments at large.
Finally, SSPs are meant to serve as baseline scenarios, that is, represent the
world in the absence of climate policy and climate change. While useful for ensuring
consistency across modeling groups, this is also the elephant in the room because
climate impacts are already happening and will likely intensify and/or become
more frequent. With increasingly robust evidence on future climate change hazards,
it is unrealistic to, for example, expect perpetual economic growth in countries
that are heavily reliant on agriculture or tourism, especially in the absence of
adaptation considerations. Integration of such impacts will require a dynamic
understanding of adaptive capacity, which is what the toolkit developed within
this thesis is intended to help with.
6.3 Outlook
6.3.1 Future research
The toolkit for quantifying adaptive capacity presented in this thesis helps to account
for heterogeneity in socio-economic conditions conducive for adaptation, in a way
consistent with the state-of-the-art in climate change science. The methodological
approach rests on the findings of the IPCC Working Group II reports on “Climate
change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability”, with the indicators of adaptive
capacity embedded in the scenario set of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. With
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a list of dimensions relevant for adaptive capacity continuously increasing with
additional research, the portfolio of indicators presented here can be further enhanced
with alternative and additional adaptation-relevant factors. Chapters 2 and 3 rely
on existing multi-dimensional quantitative indicators of governance and gender
inequality commonly used in the development arena, but they can by no means
capture all relevant aspects of neither governance nor gender equality. The range of
dimensions can also be updated with each new Assessment Report of the IPCC or
other syntheses of evidence. Further extensions of the scenario set with alternative
indicators would help validate the existing indicators and provide a more robust
representation of a given dimension. A promising near term research agenda
could be expanding the SSP set with indicators of technology (e.g., technology
learning curves or technology adoption metrics for different adaptation options),
costs of capital (related to the financing of adaptation investments), but also social
conflicts and crises (including pandemics) which could cause major disruptions
and decrease adaptive capacity.
Future research could use different approaches to deduce sector-specific compo-
nents of adaptive capacity. Chapters 4 and 5 use simple econometric relationships
to estimate the socio-economic factors conducive to the deployment of a given
adaptation option. However, other approaches could, for example, assign weights
based on findings of a literature review, meta-analyses, qualitative evidence, case
studies, expert elicitation and other methods that can assess the relative importance
of the different socio-economic factors. Alternative approaches would also add a
robustness check to the results presented here.
The primary future use of the toolkit is intended for holistic estimates of climate
change impacts. Projection exercises of the future cooling gap and yield gap in
Chapters 4 and 5 indicate large regional inequalities in the level of adaptive capacity
and the potential future uptake of adaptation. A next step would be for impact
models to incorporate an indicator of adaptation that can be expected based on socio-
economic conditions in estimates of climate-related heat stress risks for populations.
Or, building on the results of Chapter 5, estimates of climate impacts on crops based
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can be adjusted for the level of irrigation can be expected given the socio-economic
scenario. Importantly, the cooling gap and the yield gap used to demonstrate the
application of adaptive capacity in the sectoral chapters are useful heuristic devices
for identifying other gaps in adaptation beyond health and agriculture presented
here. Future research based on different adaptation options across different sectors
would give insights into the temporal pathways of closing those gaps.
Incorporating adaptive capacity as a component of complex IAMs requires an
understanding of the individual models’ requirements and identification of specific
modules that could account for adaptation. However, models that already work
with SSP scenarios will be well-equipped to do so. Concrete next steps would
be to translate adaptive capacity pathways in the different SSP scenarios into
model-specific parameters that estimate, for example, the economic impacts of
climate change.
6.3.2 Relevance of adaptive capacity for loss and damage
Assessment of future development trajectories for overcoming barriers to adaptation
can provide information about the plausible level of adaptation that societies might
achieve at a certain point in time and thereby ascertain the projected loss and damage
arising from climate hazards after the adaptation possibilities have been exceeded.
Analyses of future adaptive capacity can help identify barriers that can or cannot
be overcome and thereby pose limits to adaptation, i.e., points beyond which a given
system cannot be expected to counteract climate hazards with adaptation. Chapters
1 and 2 have shown even under scenarios of rapid and sustainable development,
improvements of adaptive capacity in many low-income countries will take on
average at least three decades. These timescales indicate that (temporal) limits
to improvements in adaptive capacity exist in the near-term, but may also persist
throughout the century, depending on which pathway of socio-economic development
is followed. Slow improvements and low adaptive capacity increase the risks of
climate change impacts, particularly in areas of lower socio-economic development.
If adaptive capacity reaches limits to improvements, climate hazards would be
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more likely to outgrow the possibilities to adapt, thereby increasing risks and
severity of impacts. Loss and damage for areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa or Small
Island Developing States emerge even from model estimates which rely on optimal
adaptation, which suggests that loss and damage would increase if the ability to adapt
is not sufficient to do so in an optimal way (Markandya and González-Eguino 2019).
A recent case study on loss and damage from Bangladesh (Bhowmik et al.
2021) identifies a lack of capacities such as access to technology, information and
income-generating activities to relate to adaptation limits. Inability to adapt results
in residual damages that can be classified as loss and damage. Factors identified
in the case study are consistent with the IPCC barriers to adaptation and the
SSP framework. The advances made in this thesis with the temporal evolution of
adaptive pathways could be a starting point to identify timescales of barriers to
adaptation and the potential economic and non-economic loss and damage.
This thesis contributes towards a more advanced understanding of adaptation
pathways, ultimately aiming to support the global efforts to prevent dangerous
impacts of climate change while achieving sustainable development for all. Climate
change risks will crucially depend on the level of vulnerability, which is a function of
the capacity to adapt to climate change. Many areas of the world are experiencing
intensifying climate impacts while trying to achieve multiple socio-economic develop-
ment goals. The effects of anthropogenic climate change will be felt in these regions
already in the near term (King, Black, et al. 2016), implying that adaptation actions
are inevitable to reduce damages before the mitigation efforts show effect. With the
need for adaptation apparent on both near and long-term time scales, it is important
to understand the factors which act as barriers to building adaptive capacity and
regard them in conjunction with broader development objectives. Tackling climate
change in the context of sustainable development, as stipulated in Article 2 of the
Paris Agreement, is one of the biggest challenges of our times. Adaptation will
be crucial for overcoming that challenge, but it must not be taken for granted.
Instead, substantial investments in various areas of socio-economic development will
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be needed to build adaptive capacities and support developing countries in efforts






Appendix for Chapter 2: Governance in
socioeconomic pathways and its role for
future adaptive capacity
123
A. Appendix for Chapter 2: Governance in socioeconomic pathways and its role for
future adaptive capacity
Table A.1: Regression results
Dependent variable:
Governance
FE OLS FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP per capita 0.044∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Higher education 0.122∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.041)
Gender gap −0.042∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Primary education −0.010
(0.039)
Lower secondary education −0.239∗∗∗
(0.038)
Upper secondary education −0.206∗∗∗
(0.047)
Observations 2,754 2,754 2,754 2,754 2,754
R2 0.978 0.613 0.978 0.979 0.978
Adjusted R2 0.977 0.613 0.977 0.977 0.977
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01





GDP per capita 0.055∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)




Observations 3,047 2,754 2,754
R2 0.976 0.978 0.978
Adjusted R2 0.975 0.976 0.977
Residual Std. Error 0.031 (df = 2842) 0.030 (df = 2560) 0.030 (df = 2559)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Category Percentile Governance indicatorrange
ND-GAIN
readiness range
Very good >90th >0.82 >0.67
Good 75th – 89th 0.66 – 0.82 0.52 – 0.66
Medium 50th – 74th 0.51 – 0.66 0.40 – 0.51
Weak 26th – 49th 0.39 – 0.50 0.30 – 0.39
Very weak <25th <0.38 <0.29
Table A.3: Categorization of the governance indicator and the ND-GAIN readiness
indicator by percentiles and the respective ranges.
Figure A.1: Compositional analysis of regression coefficients. The bars show the
proportion of each covariate’s coefficient estimate that relates to each of the dimensions
of the governance index. The distinct relationship is shown for post-secondary education
having a comparatively larger effect on control of corruption and government effectiveness.
Separate projections for these two components are shown on Figures 2-5.
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Figure A.2: Projections of the WGI government effectiveness component for 2050.
Figure A.3: Projections of the WGI government effectiveness component for 2100.
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Figure A.4: Projections of the WGI control of corruption component for 2050.
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Figure A.5: Projections of the WGI control of corruption component for 2100.
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Figure A.6: Projections of the ND GAIN readiness component in 2050.
Figure A.7: Projections of the ND GAIN readiness component in 2100.
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B.1 Model validation
We assess the predictive ability of the variables used and the model employed
using a simple validation exercise based on an out-of-sample predictive exercise.
Using data spanning the period 2000-2005, we estimate an autoregressive model
for our gender inequality variable, which serves as a benchmark to evaluate the
(out-of-sample) predictive content of the information contained in the covariates
of our specification. The autoregressive specification is given by
GII∗i,t = αi + ϑGII∗i,t−5 + εi,t,
implying that the dynamics of the gender inequality index can be explained by
mean reverting dynamics around a country-specific equilibrium which is given by
αi/(1 − ϑ). Using this specification after estimating it for the period 2000-2005, we
can obtain out-of-sample forecasts for all the countries in our sample for the year
2010. We also estimate a model that includes information about GDP per capita,
education and the education gap, the three driving factors of gender inequality
we consider in our main specification,
GII∗i,t = αi+ϑGII∗i,t−5+β1 lnGDPpci,t−5+β2educationi,t−5+β3educationgapi,t−5+εi,t
where the covariates enter with a lag of five years to allow for five years-ahead
out-of-sample predictions. After estimating this specification for the period 2000-
2005, we can obtain predictions of the gender inequality index in 2010 for the
countries in our sample based on a model that includes information on income and
education dynamics. Expanding the set of in-sample observations to 2000-2006, we
can obtain out-of-sample predictions for the year 2011 and repeating this exercise
by expanding the sample used to estimate the model we can obtain 1202 five








Table B.1: Out-of-sample validation exercise, model vs. benchmark AR specification
Supplementary Table 2 presents several standard measures of predictive error
for the autoregressive (AR) specification and our model (MODEL) based on these
forecasts. We compute (i) the mean squared forecast error (MSFE), which is the
average of the squared deviations between realized and forecast values; (ii) the
directional accuracy (DA) statistic, which gives the percentage of out-of-sample
observations whose direction of change (increase or decrease) was correctly predicted,
and (iii) the directional value (DV), which gives the average absolute value of the
correctly predicted changes and should inform about whether the corresponding
model fails at forecasting important changes in the target variable.
The results of the validation exercise based on the out-of-sample predictive
ability of the model used give clear evidence that the covariates used in the
model contain predictive information about future changes in the gender inequality
index. In addition to reducing MSFE, the use of variables related to income,
education and its distribution across genders increases directional accuracy very
substantially, from around 56% correctly predicted changes to almost 69%. In
addition, the changes which are forecast correctly are on average larger than those
in the benchmark specification.
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Figure B.1: GII projections for all SSPs in 2050
Figure B.2: GII projections for all SSPs in 2050
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Figure B.3: GII projections for all SSPs in 2050
Figure B.4: GII projections for all SSPs in 2050
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Figure B.5: GII projections for all SSPs in 2050
Figure B.6: GII projections for all SSPs in 2100
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Figure B.7: GII projections for all SSPs in 2100
Figure B.8: GII projections for all SSPs in 2100
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Figure B.9: GII projections for all SSPs in 2100
Figure B.10: GII projections for all SSPs in 2100
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Figure B.11: GII reconstruction validation. Timeseries of the Gender Inequality Index
(GII). The figure shows country-level values for the original index calculated by the UNDP
and the authors’ replication of the method.
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Figure B.12: GII reconstruction validation. Timeseries of the Gender Inequality Index
(GII). The figure shows country-level values for the original index calculated by the UNDP
and the authors’ replication of the method.
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Figure B.13: GII reconstruction validation. Timeseries of the Gender Inequality Index
(GII). The figure shows country-level values for the original index calculated by the UNDP
and the authors’ replication of the method.
140
B. Appendix for Chapter 3: Overcoming gender inequality for climate resilient
development
Figure B.14: GII reconstruction validation. Timeseries of the Gender Inequality Index
(GII). The figure shows country-level values for the original index calculated by the UNDP
and the authors’ replication of the method.
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Figure B.15: GII reconstruction validation. Timeseries of the Gender Inequality Index
(GII). The figure shows country-level values for the original index calculated by the UNDP
and the authors’ replication of the method.
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C.1 Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs)
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways provide a scenario space to explore the range of
possible changes in socioeconomic conditions over the next century. They can be
thought of as “what-if” scenarios of implications of the socioeconomic parameters
for challenges to climate change adaptation and mitigation. SSPs quantify five
different narratives of socioeconomic futures to operationalize them for climate
change research (O’Neill, Kriegler, et al. 2017). They are a widely used tool in
the climate research community, indispensable for integrated assessments of the
dynamics between socioeconomic and climate change variables and are also the
scenario framework used in the Sixth Assessment report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
SSP1, the ‘sustainability’ scenario, is characterized by low challenges to mit-
igation and adaptation, a result of increased investments in education, health,
renewable energy sources and declining inequalities between and within countries,
thus limiting impacts and increasing adaptive capacity. SSP2, the ‘middle of the
road’ scenario, maintains premediated challenges to adaptation and mitigation, and
is a pathway of uneven and slower socioeconomic progress, compatible with the
continuation of historical trends. SSP3 is characterized by high challenges to both
mitigation and adaptation, which are a product of a growing divergence between
economies, weak international cooperation and increase in internal and international
conflicts. SSP4, the scenario of ‘inequality’, leads to low challenges for mitigation,
due to technological advancements in high income countries, but high challenges
for adaptation, because of an unequal distribution of advancements and resources
across countries. Finally, SSP5 is similar to SSP1 in the fast socioeconomic progress
on all fronts, but with the major difference of the progress being powered by fossil
fuels, which produces substantially higher emissions and resulting climate impacts
but assumes low adaptation challenges because of high socioeconomic development.
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C.2 Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs)
RCPs are scenarios of future greenhouse gas emissions and air pollutants – and
therefore of future warming – which are used as inputs to climate models and for
assessment of future climate impacts. They are used in conjunction with the SSP
scenarios which show the socioeconomic component of the future pathways.
C.3 Climate maximum saturation
The climate parameter (climate maximum saturation) defines the level of AC
ownership only as a function of the CDDs, if unconstrained by income (i.e. everyone
who needs AC can afford one). We use the parametrization of the relationship
between climate maximum saturation and CDDs from McNeil and Letschert (2007).
They derived the functional relationship on the sample of census divisions in the
United States (New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North
Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain North,
Mountain South Pacific), under the assumption that they span many different
climatic zones, but that AC ownership is largely unconstrained by income.
The relationship between climate maximum saturation and CDDs is found to be
an logarithmic function (McNeil and Letschert 2008; Isaac and van Vuuren 2009),
i.e. the need for AC increases rapidly with growing degree days, but tapers off as it
reaches. The set point temperature for which CDDs are calculated is based on the
estimate of the temperature at which the energy use is at the minimum (neither
cooling nor heating). In previous studies, CDDs were routinely calculated with the
set point temperature of 18°C which is the estimate based on the minimum energy
use in the US and Europe (Isaac and van Vuuren 2009). Set point temperature
reflects preferences for indoor temperature, which are a result of different factors
such as thermal history (longer term experience with pervious thermal conditions)
and thermal comfort zone (Jowkar et al. 2020), lifestyle factors (Fabi et al. 2013), and
infrastructural factors such as prevalent building characteristics (De Cian et al. 2019).
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Figure C.1: Climate maximum saturation for different set point temperatures.
Since these factors that influence thermal comfort vary around the world, and
here we use a sample with countries beyond the US and Europe, we analyze the AC
ownership for the set point temperature thresholds of 18°C, 20°C, 22°C and 24°C.
For orientation, Argentina would currently have 898 (162) population weighted
CDDs with the set point temperature of 18°C (24°C), Italy would have 654 (116),
Nigeria 3356 (1391), or the United States 956 (254).
We adjust the climate maximum saturation curves for the different set point
temperatures to make the model more contextually relevant. To do so, we fit a
spline function to the relationship between CDDs for 18°C and each of the other
four set point temperatures we show here. We then use the coefficient estimate
for the temperature-specific covariate to calculate CDD18 equivalents for other
set point temperatures and calculate their respective climate maximum saturation
curves as shown on Supplementary Figure 1.
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For future projections of Climate Maximum Saturation, we use CDDs in three
scenarios of future greenhouse gas emissions – the Representative Concentration
Pathways (RCPs): 2.6, 4.5 and 6.0.










Constant −1.762∗∗∗ −0.055 −0.345
(0.179) (0.673) (0.688)
Observations 67 67 67
R2 0.629 0.665 0.695
Log Likelihood 57.083 60.215 62.386
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01










Australia East Asia & Pacific
China East Asia & Pacific
Fiji East Asia & Pacific
Indonesia East Asia & Pacific
Japan East Asia & Pacific
South Korea East Asia & Pacific
Laos East Asia & Pacific
Myanmar (Burma) East Asia & Pacific
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Table C.2: Regional classification of countries (continued)
Country Region
Thailand East Asia & Pacific
Vietnam East Asia & Pacific
Albania Europe










Argentina Latin America & Caribbean
Barbados Latin America & Caribbean
Belize Latin America & Caribbean
Brazil Latin America & Caribbean
Chile Latin America & Caribbean
Colombia Latin America & Caribbean
Dominican Republic Latin America & Caribbean
El Salvador Latin America & Caribbean
Guyana Latin America & Caribbean
Honduras Latin America & Caribbean
Jamaica Latin America & Caribbean
Mexico Latin America & Caribbean
St. Lucia Latin America & Caribbean
Trinidad & Tobago Latin America & Caribbean
Uruguay Latin America & Caribbean
Algeria Middle East & North Africa
Egypt Middle East & North Africa
Iran Middle East & North Africa
Iraq Middle East & North Africa
Jordan Middle East & North Africa
Saudi Arabia Middle East & North Africa
Tunisia Middle East & North Africa
Palestinian Territories Middle East & North Africa
Yemen Middle East & North Africa
Canada North America
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Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa
Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa
Central African Republic Sub-Saharan Africa
Congo - Brazzaville Sub-Saharan Africa










South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
South Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa
Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa



























ARG 39.3 34.6 -4.7 0.8 31.0 27.5 3.6
ARM 30.3 21.4 -8.9 0.4 11.1 7.9 3.2
AUS 99.3 96.2 -3.0 0.7 75.0 70.5 4.5
AZE 46.3 34.7 -11.6 0.7 33.3 25.0 8.3
BFA 1.3 8.4 7.2 1.0 0.5 8.4 -7.9
BGD 1.2 7.3 6.2 1.0 0.4 7.3 -6.8
BIH 8.1 18.8 10.7 0.3 2.5 6.4 -3.8
BRA 8.9 18.3 9.4 1.0 8.0 17.7 -9.7
CAF 1.0 3.8 2.8 1.0 0.2 3.7 -3.5
CAN 99.3 93.3 -6.0 0.3 48.0 32.1 15.9
CHL 17.0 28.0 11.0 0.1 0.8 1.4 -0.6
CHN 50.3 18.2 -32.1 0.8 41.3 15.0 26.4
CIV 2.4 7.4 4.9 1.0 1.7 7.3 -5.6
CMR 2.0 11.8 9.8 1.0 1.3 11.6 -10.3
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COG 13.1 13.3 0.1 1.0 12.4 13.1 -0.7
COL 2.4 12.3 9.9 1.0 1.6 11.8 -10.2
DOM 8.7 14.9 6.2 1.0 7.9 14.5 -6.6
DZA 49.7 36.5 -13.2 0.8 41.2 30.2 10.9
EGY 4.4 15.9 11.5 1.0 3.6 15.2 -11.6
ESP 82.9 75.1 -7.8 0.6 54.0 48.6 5.4
ETH 1.5 9.7 8.2 0.8 0.6 7.9 -7.3
FJI 4.4 15.7 11.4 1.0 3.6 15.3 -11.7
FRA 45.9 87.4 41.5 0.3 14.0 26.7 -12.7
GAB 12.5 26.9 14.5 1.0 11.8 26.6 -14.9
GHA 1.6 10.0 8.4 1.0 0.8 10.0 -9.1
GMB 1.9 10.7 8.8 1.0 1.2 10.6 -9.5
GNB 1.5 5.3 3.8 1.0 0.8 5.3 -4.5
GUY 2.5 12.1 9.6 1.0 1.8 12.1 -10.2
HND 5.9 6.2 0.3 1.0 5.1 6.0 -0.9
IDN 9.6 14.7 5.1 1.0 9.0 14.7 -5.7
IND 18.5 13.1 -5.4 1.0 17.9 13.0 4.9
IRN 2.6 19.4 16.9 0.9 1.7 17.7 -16.0
IRQ 40.1 31.8 -8.3 1.0 39.4 31.4 8.0
ITA 70.2 78.9 8.7 0.5 36.6 40.9 -4.3
JAM 5.8 17.1 11.2 1.0 5.1 16.7 -11.7
JOR 11.2 26.1 14.8 0.9 9.7 23.7 -14.0
JPN 99.3 90.1 -9.2 0.7 91.0 65.3 25.7
KAZ 26.1 32.6 6.5 0.6 15.9 20.2 -4.3
KGZ 16.0 12.3 -3.7 0.3 5.3 4.2 1.1
KOR 96.0 73.1 -23.0 0.7 69.3 52.4 17.0
LAO 5.6 10.5 4.8 1.0 4.9 10.2 -5.4
MDV 17.8 18.4 0.6 1.0 17.3 18.4 -1.1
MEX 15.3 21.1 5.8 0.9 13.3 19.0 -5.7
MKD 79.7 18.1 -61.6 0.3 27.6 6.2 21.4
MLI 1.6 10.7 9.1 1.0 0.9 10.7 -9.8
NER 1.5 7.6 6.1 1.0 0.8 7.6 -6.9
NGA 2.8 8.6 5.8 1.0 2.1 8.6 -6.5
NLD 99.3 96.7 -2.6 0.1 11.0 4.9 6.1
PAK 15.2 16.0 0.8 1.0 14.5 15.8 -1.3
RUS 29.8 36.0 6.2 0.3 9.1 11.1 -2.0
SAU 63.3 41.8 -21.5 1.0 63.0 41.5 21.5
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SDN 4.8 6.8 2.0 1.0 4.1 6.8 -2.7
SEN 2.6 10.7 8.0 1.0 1.9 10.6 -8.7
SLV 2.5 13.3 10.8 1.0 1.8 13.0 -11.3
SRB 19.5 22.7 3.2 0.4 8.2 9.7 -1.6
SSD 0.8 5.2 4.4 1.0 0.1 5.2 -5.1
SWE 99.3 97.8 -1.5 0.1 20.0 5.0 15.0
THA 21.0 19.1 -1.8 1.0 20.5 19.1 1.4
TJK 17.4 15.7 -1.7 0.7 11.9 11.0 0.8
TUN 26.1 24.6 -1.6 0.9 22.7 21.7 1.1
TUR 19.6 27.7 8.0 0.6 11.7 16.8 -5.2
UKR 9.8 28.3 18.6 0.4 3.9 12.1 -8.2
URY 41.3 39.2 -2.1 0.7 28.7 27.4 1.3
USA 99.3 94.0 -5.3 0.8 87.8 76.8 11.0
VNM 5.2 10.2 5.0 1.0 4.5 10.1 -5.6
YEM 13.9 14.8 0.9 0.9 12.3 13.6 -1.3
ZAF 8.7 6.7 -2.1 0.7 6.0 4.9 1.1
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Figure C.2: Model selection based on the smallest residual.
Figure C.3: Population exposure in different combinations of set point temperature
and the count of CDDs. Estimates shown are for the socioeconomic scenario SSP2 and
emissions scenario RCP 4.5.
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Figure C.4: Population affected by cooling gap across all socioeconomic scenarios (SSPs
1-5).
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Figure C.5: Sources of uncertainty for exposed population, shown as a deviation from
the central estimate (SSP2/RCP4.5 and median exposure for >50, >100, >200 and >400
CDDs above the set point temperature of 24oC).
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Figure C.6: Sources of uncertainty for population affected by cooling gap, shown as a
deviation from the central estimate (SSP2/RCP4.5 and median exposure for >50, >100,
>200 and >400 CDDs above the set point temperature of 24oC).
155
D
Appendix for Chapter 5: Scenarios of
sustainable irrigation expansion in the
21st century
156
D. Appendix for Chapter 5: Scenarios of sustainable irrigation expansion in the
21st century
Figure D.1: Sustainable irrigation calorie production (2000). Fraction between the
current sustainable irrigation calories produced compared to the total calories produced
via irrigation. Derived from Rosa et al. (2018).
Figure D.2: Unsustainable calorie production (2000). Fraction between unsustainable
calories produced via irrigation compared to the total irrigation calories produced. Derived
from Rosa et al. (2018).
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Figure D.3: Baseline share of rainfed crops in the total agricultural production. Derived














Total yield gap closure 7.88 (6.35) 6.46 (5.20)
Table D.1: Calorie production under current and yield gap closure scenarios. Sustainable
irrigation is practiced in areas where blue water consumption (BWC) does not exceed
renewable blue water availability (BWA), which accounts also for environmental flows.
Irrigation is unsustainable when BWC >BWA (i.e., it sacrifices environmental flows,
requires non-renewable groundwater resources, or inter-basin water transport. Adapted
from Rosa et al. (2018).
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Dependent Variable: SII













































Observations 138 138 138 138 138
R2 0.653 0.716 0.726 0.730 0.732















(df = 1; 136)
169.914***
(df = 2; 135)
118.519***
(df = 3; 134)
89.809***
(df = 4; 133)
72.127***
(df = 5; 132)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table D.2: Regression results
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Central Asia 96 127 156
East Asia & Pacific 592 674 739
Europe 103 122 139
Latin America & Caribbean 87 103 123
Midlle East & North Africa 50 57 63
North America 57 61 65
South Asia 327 371 414
Sub-Saharan Africa 34 70 109
Table D.3: Total amount of people fed per region via sustainable irrigation in 2020,
2050 and 2100 for SSP2. People fed were quantified assuming a calorie intake of 3343








Central Asia 93 110 12
East Asia & Pacific 588 639 661
Europe 102 115 125
Latin America & Caribbean 86 94 101
Midlle East & North Africa 50 53 55
North America 57 61 64
South Asia 321 343 355
Sub-Saharan Africa 30 46 63
Table D.4: Total amount of people fed per region via sustainable irrigation in 2020,
2050 and 2100 for SSP3. People fed were quantified assuming a calorie intake of 3343
kcal per capita per day8. The amount of people fed is recorded in million per year.
160









Central Asia 96 126 152
East Asia & Pacific 591 669 724
Europe 103 122 138
Latin America & Caribbean 87 102 119
Midlle East & North Africa 50 55 61
North America 57 62 66
South Asia 323 355 379
Sub-Saharan Africa 32 51 73
Table D.5: Total amount of people fed per region via sustainable irrigation in 2020,
2050 and 2100 for SSP4. People fed were quantified assuming a calorie intake of 3343








hline Central Asia 98 143 183
hline East Asia & Pacific 596 709 792
hline Europe 104 129 152
hline Latin America & Caribbean 88 114 140
hline Midlle East & North Africa 51 60 68
hline North America 58 63 70
hline South Asia 329 393 445
hline Sub-Saharan Africa 36 89 134
hline
Table D.6: Total amount of people fed per region via sustainable irrigation in 2020,
2050 and 2100 for SSP5. People fed were quantified assuming a calorie intake of 3343
kcal per capita per day. The amount of people fed is recorded in million per year.
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Scenario People fed (billion per year) Calories (kcal*1015 per year)
2000 1.4 1.7
Sustainable at YGC 3.9 4.9
2100 SSP1 1.9 2.3
2100 SSP2 1.8 2.2
2100 SSP3 1.5 1.9
2100 SSP4 1.7 2.1
2100 SSP5 2.0 2.4
Table D.7: Total people fed and calories produced globally for different scenarios. Global
people fed in 2000 and Sustainable at YGC was quantified using data from Rosa et al
(2018). Other projections for the end of the century were quantified using our projections
and can also be derived from Tab.1 from the main text.
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